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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN AND RELATING TO NAMIBIA

Report of Standing Committee II

Chairman: Mr. Shaukat UMER (Pakistan)

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INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 43/26 C of 17 November 1988, the General Assembly, at its forty-third session, decided that the United Nations Council for Namibia should, inter alia, review the progress of the liberation struggle in its military aspect and prepare comprehensive and analytical periodic reports related thereto. The present report has therefore been prepared in pursuance of that resolution and updates information contained in the previous report of the Council, up to 31 March 1989 (A/AC.131/283).

2. During the period under review, the South African régime continued to face undiminished opposition both inside Namibia and within its own borders, and also suffered heavy losses during its invasion of Angola. Moreover, the effects of measures adopted by the international community to isolate the régime politically and economically began to be acutely felt.

3. During 1988, the concern of the international community was focused on the outcome of a series of diplomatic initiatives and talks aimed at resolving the problems of south-western Africa in a regional context. One of the stated aims and major goals of these initiatives was the implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia. However, predictably, the régime persisted in insisting on irrelevant and extraneous issues, interjecting new demands and postponing dates announced by itself, to begin implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978.

4. The régime's motivation to enter into negotiations emanated not from a new commitment to arbitration and diplomacy, but rather from hard economic reality as a result of sanctions, huge international debt, cessation of foreign credit and lending by international financial institutions. Owing to decreased foreign investment, the South African economy is reported to have averaged only a 1.4 per cent annual growth rate since 1983 and has accumulated a foreign debt of $22 billion. 1/

5. In addition to its mounting economic problems, the régime faced military defeat during its invasion of Angola, suffering huge losses in both men and equipment. The régime is apparently taking military decisions with a view to seeing how its economic problems may be alleviated and attempting to change its image before the international community. The cost of the continued military occupation of Namibia and military aggression against neighbouring African countries has proved insurmountable. The South African régime's apparent acceptance of the diplomatic process and abandonment of the military solution does not represent a real change of policy but rather a calculated and shrewd assessment of its military predicament and bleak economic prospects.

6. The situation on the ground in Namibia did not change despite South Africa's announced intentions of compliance with the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Namibian people continued to live under military occupation of more than 100,000 South African troops supported by 10,000 police in a country with a population of approximately 1.6 million. This massive military

presence has been the main instrument of South African control over the Territory and the so-called transitional government it has imposed over the people.

7. By resolution 43/26, the General Assembly reaffirmed its full support for the armed struggle of the Namibian people, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), to achieve self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia.

8. By the same resolution, the General Assembly strongly condemned South Africa for its military buildup in Namibia, its imposition of military conscription of all Namibian males between 17 and 55 years of age into the occupying colonial army, in yet further sinister attempts to suppress the national liberation struggle of the Namibian people and to force Namibians to kill one another, its proclamation of a so-called security zone in Namibia, its recruitment and training of Namibians for tribal armies, its use of mercenaries to suppress the Namibian people and to carry out its military attacks against independent African States and its threats and acts of subversion and aggression against those States, as well as for the forcible displacement of Namibians from their homes. The Assembly also denounced the acts of aggression by the racist régime against Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, declared that Pretoria's policy of aggression and destabilization not only undermined the peace and stability of the southern African region but also constituted a threat to international peace and security, and called upon South Africa to cease all acts of aggression against the neighbouring African States.

9. Further, the General Assembly condemned and called for an immediate end to the continuing military collaboration on the part of certain Western countries with the racist régime of South Africa, and expressed its conviction that such collaboration, in addition to strengthening the aggressive military machinery of the Pretoria régime, thereby constituting a hostile action against the people of Namibia and the front-line States, was also in violation of the arms embargo imposed against South Africa under Security Council resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977.

10. It will be recalled that by its resolution 418 (1977) the Security Council decided that all States should cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related matériel. On 13 December 1984, the Council adopted resolution 558 (1984), by which it requested, inter alia, all States to refrain from importing arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles produced in South Africa. Moreover, the Council adopted resolution 591 (1986) on 28 November 1986, by which it, inter alia, urged all States to prohibit the export to South Africa of items which they had reason to believe were destined for the military and/or police forces of South Africa, had a military capacity and were intended for military purposes. By its earlier resolution 566 (1985) of 19 June 1985, the Security Council expressed its grave concern at the tension and instability created by the hostile policies of the apartheid régime throughout southern Africa and the mounting threat to the security of the region and its wider implications for international peace and security resulting from that régime's continued utilization of Namibia as a springboard for military attacks against, and destabilization of, African States in the region.

I. MILITARY OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA BY SOUTH AFRICA

A. General

11. Events during 1987 and 1988 make it clear that a convergence of factors pushed the South African régime towards a political settlement in Namibia. Several military factors induced the Pretoria régime to come to the bargaining table. One such factor was the escalating cost of continuing its military occupation of Namibia, estimated at over $1.5 million per day in 1984 and 1985. 2/ It is estimated that the cost of South Africa's defence outlay doubled between 1984 and 1985. The cost of maintaining its military occupation of Namibia is estimated to have risen to $1 billion annually by 1988. 3/ Added to this was its $200 million "contribution" to the budget of the so-called transitional government installed in Windhoek since June 1985. 4/ Moreover, police and defence allocations in the Namibian budget itself were increased to 17 per cent of total expenditures for fiscal year 1987/88. 5/ The cost of killing one People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) combatant was reported to have risen to R 600,000.* The cost would have been much higher but for the fact that part of the expense had been transferred to the so-called transitional government in Windhoek. 6/

12. These economic factors and the fact that South Africa sustained heavy losses in men and equipment during its incursions into Angola during 1988, as well as defections, mutinies and widespread indiscipline amongst its troops, forced the régime to increase white recruitment to replace black conscripts, resulting in high casualties among white soldiers - a factor which made the war increasingly unpopular among white segments of the population. It is in view of these overriding factors that South Africa's military occupation of Namibia is reviewed below.

B. Military structures

13. As previously reported, the number of South African troops present in the territory since 1985 is estimated to be 100,000. In 1985, the commander of the South African forces acknowledged that there were 40,000 troops of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) deployed along the border between Angola and Namibia. 7/ That figure excluded the troops in active and support roles outside the "operational areas". The South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, admitted to the South African Parliament that "the number of troops deployed in the various operational areas in South West Africa (Namibia) and South Africa increased by more than 5,000 per cent between 1975 and 1981", whereas the South African police in Namibia had increased by 300 per cent since 1978. 8/ During the latter half of 1988, more than 50,000 South African troops were reported by a variety of sources to be concentrated along

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* The rand has fluctuated in value against the United States dollar in recent years from R 1.0 = $US 1.00 in 1985 to R 2.76 = $US 1.00 in 1989.

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Namibia's northern border. They were concentrated in the areas of Ruacana, Ondangua and Oshakati. Reports indicate that large numbers of the civilian population were being evicted from these areas. 9/

14. Militarily, Namibia has been divided into seven "sectors", similar to South Africa's command areas. SADF directly controls the three sectors which make up the "operational area" in northern Namibia, i.e., Sector 10 (covering Kaokoland and the Ovamboland "homelands"), Sector 20 (Kavango, Bushmanland and western Caprivi) and Sector 70 (East Caprivi). Ostensible command of the remaining four military sectors has been delegated to SWATF, i.e., Sector 30 (headquarters at Otjiwarongo), Sector 40 (Windhoek), Sector 50 (Gobabis) and Sector 60 (Keetmanshoop). 10/

15. During the period under review, South Africa continued to strengthen its military presence in Namibia by moving in additional troops, in particular those withdrawing from Angola, continuing recruitment and conscription into its forces and the expansion of its military bases in the Territory. Even after SWAPO announced a unilateral cease-fire on 1 September 1988, the northern part of the country, where the majority of the population resides, remained a so-called security zone with reports of violence against civilians increasing, according to church sources. Wider effects of the war continued to include the dislocation of entire communities, disruption of the traditional economy and attempts to create groups dependent on South Africa's military presence. 5/

16. According to reports, South Africa has moved additional troops from southern Namibia to Otjiwarongo and Okahandja in the central region and to Oshakati and Ondangua in the north (see military map). South African military bases at Eenhana, Ogongo, Okalongo, Grootfontein, Oshivelo and Okongo, among others, have been expanded and more jet fighters deployed at the forward air base at Ondangua and at Rundu. SADF is reported to have invited tenders of R 15 million for the construction of an underground military base at Ondangua, also to be used as a detention centre. 11/ Parliamentarians from the Federal Republic of Germany visiting northern Namibia described the highway as "one large convoy" and confirmed the further militarization of the northern part of the territory. In addition, a line of bases south of Ovamboland has been strengthened. 12/

17. Defences around Oshakati, 32 kilometres from the border, are reported to have been strengthened by the addition of surface-to-air missiles and artillery, "with guns firing at random into the surrounding bush to discourage guerrilla attacks". Moreover, the large numbers of G-5 155-millimetre long-range howitzers that were pulled out from Angola were reported to be deployed in northern Namibia as well. 13/

18. South Africa maintains a major operational base at Grootfontein which is connected by railway to southern Namibia. SADF has constructed a 150-kilometre highway which runs north to the border with Angola. Other bases located at Ruacana, Oshakati and Ondangua are closer, whereas from the Katima Mulilo air base in the Caprivi Strip, the whole of central Africa is within air range. 14/

19. South African military strength was increased from about March 1987 onwards with heavy artillery, earth-moving equipment and troops concentrated in northern Namibia for operations conducted in Angola. Two new pontoon bridges were built

across the Cubango River into Angola, one at a point east of Rundu and the other at Andara in western Caprivi. 15/ Tenders and contracts for the expansion and construction of the Rundu military base were given out totalling an estimated expense of R 300,000 to R 3 million. The airstrip at Rundu was also extended and security strengthened with military aircraft arriving nightly. In western Caprivi, military bases at Omega, Alpha and Buffalo were further expanded and an all-weather road constructed 15 to 25 kilometres from the border. 16/

20. The South African military has attached special importance to retaining control of the Caprivi Strip in Namibia as an important strategic point of entry into the neighbouring African countries. Recent press reports indicate that the União Nacional para a Indepéndência Total de Angola (UNITA) is moving its troops and their families into the Caprivi Strip in "unprecedented numbers". Reports state that this is an attempt to establish "refugee" camps inside the Caprivi before the arrival of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), so that they could be used as supply depots for UNITA activities as well as an attempt to pass their troops and families off as Namibians. 17/

C. Military and police forces

21. It will be recalled that South Africa established the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) in August 1980, under a nominally separate command structure, and a "separate defence department" was created at Windhoek. Eight months later, a similar transformation of the police force took place and the South West Africa Police (SWAP) was created. The establishment of SWATF in 1980, after the adoption of Security Council resolution 435 (1978), was an attempt to bring the ethnic units together with a number of SADF units to create a so-called South West African army.

22. Although SWATF has its own formal command structure and distinctive uniforms and issues all its war communiqués in Namibia so as to give the appearance of a separate force, it is in reality an integral part of the South African forces in Namibia and its command structure is fully integrated into the SADF command structure. Pretoria's obvious intention is to have a military force in Namibia which is ostensibly Namibian even if it is commanded, equipped and supplied by Pretoria. SWATF and SWAP remain administrative subsections of SADF and the South African police with no operational responsibility - which remain under direct control of SADF.

23. The South African "General Officer Commanding SWATF" also serves as "South West Africa Secretary of Defence" and "Officer Commanding South West Africa Command", the last office being an SADF post exercising command over South African forces and counter-insurgency operations. According to South African sources, SWATF, composed of some 21,000 troops, provides approximately 30 per cent of the troops in the operational area. 18/ The régime therefore admits that 70 per cent of the troops in the operational area of northern Namibia are its own.

24. According to South African sources, SWATF is conscripted on a "selective basis" and is the planned outcome of "political expediency, solid military

realities and some perspicacious contingency planning ...". But because "it was obvious that Namibia was inching inexorably towards independence ...", and that "seven years on, SWATF might still be under ultimate South African command, it has its own uniform, organization and identity. It is developing its own mystique and mythology, intangible but essential ingredients to a successful military force". 19/

25. SWATF is structurally identical to SADF, being militia-based and composed of a mobile conventional warfare element (Reaction Force) and an area-bound counter-insurgency element (Area Force).

26. The first major component of SWATF, the Reaction Force, comprises two elements, a motorized brigade and six infantry battalions. The motorized, conventional warfare brigade is made up of three motorized infantry battalions and one armoured car regiment. One battalion is made up of full-time troops while the two others are reported to include Citizen Force troops, called up on a selective basis and trained at the South African Infantry Battalion Group at Walvis Bay, with advanced training at the South West Africa Military School at Okahandja. The six full-time light infantry battalions are locally recruited from "specific ethno/cultural groups, with a sprinkling of outsiders to provide needed expertise". Each battalion is trained by its own officer corps and operates in a specific area throughout the year. South Africa has recruited these six battalions from the so-called homelands, one composed of Ovambos, two battalions of San (Bushmen) composed largely of mercenaries brought in from Angola, one battalion of East Caprivians, one from Kaokoland and one from the Kavango "homeland". 20/ These are counter-insurgency units, whereas the motorized brigade has primarily a conventional role, with certain elements serving in the operational area as well.

27. The second major component of SWATF is the Area Force, consisting of 26 part-time units similar to the South African commando battalions, composed of a motley of conscripts and recruits, varying in size and structure and operating in their base areas. 21/

28. Logistic and support elements consist of one engineer unit, one signal unit, a parachute battalion and a specialized mounted unit which conducts its "man-hunts" both on horseback and Scrambler motorcycle. 21/

29. The South African military's publication Paratus, in its issue of February 1988, states that at present SWATF and SWAP mainly undertake the counter-insurgency function, "while the elements of the South African army in South West Africa (Namibia) are mainly responsible for providing for the conventional defence of the country and for undertaking the specialist supporting functions". 22/

30. Moreover, the South African military has increasingly relied on élite, highly trained, largely secret, special forces who have borne the brunt of front-line operations since 1985, the most notorious of these being the Buffalo Battalion, established in the Kavango "bantustan" in 1976, and made up of Angolan mercenaries. The 32nd Battalion and the Counter Insurgency Unit (COIN) of the South West Africa Police are supplemented by two other special units - the South West African Police Special Task Force and the South West Africa Specialists, a force directly answerable to SADF. 23/ Indicative of the widespread indiscipline and recent

growing opposition among Namibian conscripts in SWATF is the preference of SADF for using regular rather than conscripted troops.

31. The organizational base of SADF is the "skeleton battalion", four of which are deployed in Sector 10 alone, which covers the so-called Ovambo and Kaokoland "bantustans". The headquarters and administrative staff are drawn from the Permanent Force and serve for two to three years in the "operational area". The combat elements of each battalion differ in size and composition. Each battalion area is divided into company areas, with operations conducted from permanent company bases. Infantry companies, armoured vehicle squadrons and engineer units are drawn from South Africa, the Citizens Force and Commandos. 24/

32. The South African police has three main elements which are closely involved in military functions, the COIN units, a guard force and a special unit known as Koevoet or OPS-K. COIN units have the responsibility for a specific sector and are composed of both South African police and SWAP members. They serve in the "operational area" as army rifle companies or platoons. The guard force is recruited locally, trained at the police training school near Ondangua and deployed for key point protection and rural counter-insurgency, using light infantry weapons, light machine guns and 60-millimetre mortars. Their installations are protected with bunkers and emplaced machine guns. Mine-resistant vehicles are utilized during patrols. 25/

33. The notorious Koevoet branch of the police, established in 1979, is a mobile counter-insurgency unit composed of locally recruited constables and non-commissioned officers trained and commanded by South African police and SWAP officers. It provides speedy response to intelligence gained by the Security branch. Its main headquarters is at Oshakati, with area headquarters of several locations. Koevoet patrols go out in combat form mostly in Casspir armoured personnel carriers. While technically designated a police unit, it boasts of 80 per cent of the "kills" in the "operational area" and that it is "without doubt the premier unit available to the security forces for their internal operations". 26/

34. The fourth police force involved in counter-insurgency operations is the SWAP Task Force with headquarters at Windhoek and area bases throughout northern Namibia. The mode of operation is similar to Koevoet, with additional activities in urban centres. 27/

35. On the ground, the activities and roles of the various branches of the SADF, SWATF and police forces are highly interactive and include the following categories: (a) border control, with patrols conducted on foot and in armoured vehicles along the one-kilometre "no go" zone along the border with Angola; (b) patrolling, including border, road and random patrols, carried out by platoons; (c) search-and-destroy missions with the assistance of helicopters; (d) ambushes, observation and listening posts; (e) road-blocks; (f) protection of military installations; 28/ (g) operations to control the civilian population, most recently concentrated against students and the campaign against conscription into its occupation forces.

36. The majority of the above operations are carried out with heavy reliance on armoured vehicles such as Elands, Buffels, Hippo, Casspir and Ratel infantry-carrying vehicles (ICVs), and the extensive use of mine-resistant vehicles for the transport of troops and supplies. 29/

37. South Africa also has an air force unit in Namibia called the 112 Squadron, a commando squadron which operates with civilian light aircraft. However, all air force activity of any military significance is directly conducted by the South African Air Force, with the 112 Squadron playing an assistance role. 30/

38. The South African Air Force operates in support of internal and external military operations and in logistical supply and evacuation roles. The Puma helicopter is the most widely used, but owing to South Africa's deficiency in obtaining helicopters, the lighter Alouette III aircraft is used for spotting, liaison and command-and-control functions. Impala MkIIs are stationed at the main air bases in the operational area, with C-130s and C-160s operating regular transport and supply flights from South Africa to the major transit base at Grootfontein and to other major bases at Ondangua, Ruacana, Rundu and Mpacha. 31/

39. During its military excursions and attacks against Angola, the Air Force uses Mirages, Buccaneers and Canberras for bombing forays; the Bosbok for normal patrolling, spotting and assistance to ground attacks; and the Kudu for transport, liaison and evacuation roles in Angola and within the operational area as well. 32/

40. According to press reports, during 1987 and 1988, South Africa's air superiority was reduced to flying its aging fleet of Mirage, Buccaneer and Canberra fighter-bombers and lightweight Impala fighter-bombers. Reports by returning South African soldiers indicate that South African helicopters undertake medical evacuation and other military operations only during the night. 14/

41. Both within South Africa and in Namibia, opposition to conscription has grown into a form of political opposition to the régime, to its system of apartheid, continued occupation of Namibia and aggression and destabilization of the front-line States.

42. The End Conscription Campaign has evolved into an effective and vigorous movement against conscription and its activities were termed one of the "four main enemies" of South Africa by the South African Minister of Law and Order, Mr. Adriaan Volk. According to him, the others are the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the South African Communist Party and the United Democratic Front (UDF). 33/

43. The Campaign was effectively banned by decree on 22 August 1988 as part of the régime's "emergency decree", following the refusal of 143 South African army conscripts to serve in the military because of their opposition to apartheid and in particular to the South African military occupation of Namibia and aggression against Angola. 34/

44. The conscientious objectors of the campaign held a news conference and gave vivid testimony to the brutalities perpetrated against the civilian population in Namibia and Angola.

> "Etienne Marais, 26, one of the men who comes from one of the well-known Afrikaans families, was a rifleman in Namibia and Angola from 1982 to 1984. Among the instances of 'intimidation and degradation' he says he witnessed was the 'shooting of a 13-year-old (Namibian) girl in cold blood' and the eight-hour torture of a 16-year-old Angolan girl.
>
> "Marais also said that collecting body parts of Namibian and Angolan fighters as souvenirs is common, as is brutality towards civilians. He urged fellow conscripts to 'break the silence' and disclose their own experiences." 35/
>
> - based on reporting by Thandeka Gaubule and Gaye Davis of the Weekly Mail (Johannesburg)

45. Members of the Campaign stated that they were

> "determined to stand their ground and would continue their 'patriotic revolt' for a constructive alternative to compulsory service. 'We believe that the SADF helps to uphold the system of apartheid. We are particularly concerned about its presence in Angola, its occupation of Namibia, its ongoing destabilization of front-line States, and its role in South Africa's black townships. We do not see serving in the SADF as a way of contributing to peace in our country.'" 36/

46. During 1987, 7,589 white youths emigrated from South Africa or went underground rather than serve in its army. The attempted suicide rate among conscripts jumped from 75 in 1985 to 404 in 1987. 36/

47. Press reports indicate that a steady stream of wounded South African soldiers are treated at the No. 1 Military Hospital at the Voortrekkerhoogte military complex and that the majority of the wounded are teen-age soldiers serving in segregated units of SADF. UNITA wounded are also flown in for treatment in South African planes. 37/

48. In a major report, Fighting for Apartheid: A Job for Life, European Citizens in the South African Defence Force, co-authored by Mr. Alman Metten, a member of the European Parliament for the Dutch Labour Party, and Dr. Paul Goodison, some startling revelations are presented concerning the involvement of European nationals in the South African armed forces. 38/

49. The report states that more than a third of white South Africans are nationals of a European country. In 1984, over 82 per cent of these also carried South African citizenship. The remaining 18 per cent were only nationals of a member country of the European Community (EC). 39/ In order to fulfil its increasing need for sufficient manpower to curb black resistance within South Africa, to maintain its occupation of Namibia and to destabilize the neighbouring countries, the régime

has gradually incorporated the white holders of European passports into the South African armed forces. The report estimates that more than one third of the South African forces consist of whites who either possess or are entitled to an EC passport.

50. In the case of Namibia, the report gives authentic testimonies of European nationals who served with SADF in Namibia and in Angola and draws attention to the fact that more than a quarter of the white population of Namibia is believed to enjoy dual citizenship in the Federal Republic of Germany and many serve in SADF and SWATF. 40/

51. In the preface to the report, Dr. C. F. Bayers Naudé, former Secretary-General of the South African Council of Churches and a renowned Afrikaaner theologian, states that "apartheid society is increasingly falling under the spell of violence. There is a far-reaching process of militarization and this violence in southern Africa has equally become the responsibility of the Governments in the countries of the European Community". 41/

52. Inside Namibia, the actions by young people and students against conscription into SWATF, the presence of military bases close to educational institutions and the acts of intimidation and terror by these military forces grew into an organized campaign with demonstrations and class boycotts calling for the closing of military and police bases near educational institutions. The campaign has received the full support of teaching staff, parents and the churches. Further, some 5,000 Namibian youths escaped into Angola during 1988, fleeing from the threat of conscription into SWATF and the fear of harassment by South African military personnel. 42/ The South African authorities have retaliated with unprecedented brutality. For details on this aspect, see the Standing Committee II report on social conditions (A/AC.131/312).

53. SWATF announced in mid-December 1988 that its conscription activities would continue according to plan for the year 1989 in accordance with South Africa's Defence Act No. 44 of 1957 and its Proclamation 198 of 1980. Conscripts were to be transferred from all sectors to Sector 40 and would undergo basic training at the South West Africa Military School, the First and Second South West Africa Specialist Units, the 911 Battalion and the First South West Africa Engineers Regiment. 43/

54. Mr. Philip Mwadingi of the human rights centre at Oshakati stated that 500 instances of brutality and destruction of property had been reported and registered at the centre between July and October 1988. SWATF is seen as the structure set up to instigate Namibians to fight against one another. The Chairperson of the SWAPO Youth League, Mr. Jerry Ekandjo, imprisoned on Robben Island from 1973 to 1981, stated that "SWATF is a future UNITA. These people will form the core of bandit groups after independence". 44/

55. As previously reported during 1987, serious instances of indiscipline and mutinies took place among the rank and file Namibian troops serving within Namibia and those used by the South African military forces in attacks against Angola.

Similar incidents continued during 1988 as well. During its siege of Cuito Cuanavale during 1988, South Africa deployed some 9,000 troops inside Angola, backed by 400 artillery pieces, 40 tanks and armoured cars and 80 aircraft based in northern Namibia. Namibians of the SWATF 201 Battalion, consisting of 3,000 Namibian black conscripts, were deployed against Cuito Cuanavale so that they could be passed off as UNITA troops. Large-scale mutinies were reported in SWATF battalions 101, 201 and 701. 45/

56. Defections continued in SWATF. A former conscript in the 101 Battalion, Pius Tutaleni, testified to the atrocities perpetrated against civilians and the psychological damage done to the young recruits. Koevoet constable Mweulyata Jonas Kemanya, an Angolan who had left Koevoet after five years, stated that most Koevoet officers were seconded from South Africa. He also stated that although the Koevoet troops were paid R 600 a month, they were poorly educated and lacked discipline and that the main activities of Koevoet had as their aim "to terrorize Namibian civilians and discredit SWAPO". 46/

57. It will be recalled that, faced with the possibility of elections supervised by the United Nations, South Africa attempted to annex Walvis Bay in 1977 in order to exclude it from negotiations over Namibia's transition to independence. The attempt to annex Walvis Bay has been overwhelmingly condemned by Governments, the United Nations and SWAPO. In a statement issued on 7 September 1977, the United Nations Council for Namibia objected to, and condemned in the strongest terms, the unilateral attempt by South Africa to destroy the territorial unity and integrity of Namibia and stated that Walvis Bay had always been an integral part of Namibia and South Africa had no right to change its status or to appropriate it as part of its own territory. 47/ Endorsing this view, the General Assembly, by its resolution 32/9 D of 4 November 1977 and subsequent resolutions, condemned the South African attempts at annexation as "an act of colonial expansion", declaring that "such annexation [was] illegal, null and void". Those condemnations were endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 432 (1978) of 27 July 1978.

58. Walvis Bay lies more than 600 kilometres north of the South African border and has a population of 24,000. An estimated 3,500 troops are permanently based at Walvis Bay, which is one of the most militarized areas in southern Africa. The Second South Africa Infantry Battalion group is based there. It is the only SADF unit combining infantry and armour and has played an important role in attacks on Angola. Walvis Bay is also the site of the Rooikop military airfield from which Mirage and Buccaneer jets take off for attacks against Angola. Its port is protected by a marine unit and is regularly visited by South African warships. As the main centre for the training of Namibian conscripts, the facilities at Walvis Bay are being continually expanded. The importance of Walvis Bay cannot be overestimated. Not only is it Namibia's only fully equipped deep-water port, but it is also the major railroad connection to Windhoek and the northern part of the country. Its strategic importance was further enhanced by the recent discovery of extensive oil and natural gas reserves off the Namibian coast. The South African Minister of Defence recently informed the South African Parliament that SADF is to spend R 22 million by 1990 in upgrading its buildings at Walvis Bay. 48/

59. On 4 August 1988, using Walvis Bay for a base, South Africa began for a two-week period its biggest naval exercise, code named "Operation Magêrsfontein", designed to test the capacity of the South African navy to operate far from home ports and logistic infrastructure and to protect South African maritime interests, not just the strategic Cape sea route. Ships and sailors from all the flotillas took part in the operations which featured the full spectrum of naval activity, including surface and air tactical gunnery, mine countermeasures, refuelling at sea, amphibious landing and withdrawal exercises by marines and deployment of ships and submarines away from base. 49/

II. MILITARY EXPENDITURE

60. The South African budget for fiscal year 1988/89 presented to the all-white Parliament by the régime on 15 March 1988 represented an expenditure of R 53.9 billion ($27 billion), recording an increase of 12.6 per cent over the 1987/88 budget against a current inflation rate of 14.2 per cent. The major exception to the austerity budget was defence. After a 30 per cent increase in the 1987/88 budget, defence spending went up by 22.6 per cent to R 8,090 million in 1988/89. 50/ The military budget is double that of the 1984/85 military budget (R 4.15 billion), reflecting the heavy cost of the continued military occupation of Namibia and Angola.

61. In the past, only the estimated cash requirement was voted and the South African white Parliament authorized SADF to incur further liabilities for equipment orders. During the consideration of the 1988/89 budget, the total expenditure was budgeted. The South African Minister of Finance, Mr. Barend Du Plessis, stated that the economy had been "hamstrung" by the impact of sanctions. The largest new allocation in the defence budget is R 620 million for the provision of staff and weapons for a new "border force". The second largest increase is R 427 million, for air defence personnel and imported air force weaponry. 51/

62. The military budget is officially calculated at 4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP); however, full costs are hidden in the Public Works budget of R 153 million, which covers construction costs for military bases, and such departments as Community Development, which is responsible for housing military personnel, the Department of Health and others. 52/

63. The military expenditure of South Africa is published annually in the government budget, but police forces trained and equipped by the military are not included. South Africa's defence spending is presumably much higher: the Department of Public Works pays for SADF construction, the Department of Finance covers the considerable cost incurred by SWATF and the Department of Community Development covers the cost of housing military personnel. Examples of additional expenditure are the capital expansion of projects of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR), the military research and development carried out by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and university departments and institutes, and support for SADF Medical Services from the Department of Health and Welfare. South Africa's real defence expenditures are probably 30-35 per cent higher than the official budget figure. 53/

64. South African annual spending on maintaining its hold over Namibia is reported to be: 54/

Category	Cost (Millions of rand)
Annual defence expenditure	700
Deficit financing	308
Short-term loans guaranteed by South Africa	286
Overdraft facility at South African Reserve Bank	80

65. In mid-1988, South African economists stated that the war in Angola alone was costing the country more than $2 billion a year. These economists stated that "the economy was already showing signs of running out of steam and, should the war step up, the additional burden to finance it and develop complex new equipment with which to fight it could become intolerable". 55/

66. In addressing the South African Parliament, the Minister for Defence, General Magnus Malan, stated that although he could not reveal the total cost of SADF losses of personnel and equipment in Angola, the cost of ammunition used in "actual combat had risen fourfold in three years and that it was higher than the cost of ammunition used in training and demonstrations". In 1985-1986, the cost of combat ammunition was R 72.5 million and R 328.7 million in 1987-1988. He also reported that losses of equipment by SADF in combat and general wear and tear during 1987 were reported to be R 31.6 million by the South African Auditor General. 56/

67. Owing to white conscript casualties and the financial cost of the war, the South African army has been stretched thin in carrying out its internal repression and external aggression. It must be borne in mind that the South African army is largely a citizen army which also constitutes its work-force. A major mobilization to fight a full-scale war along the border would have a devastating effect on the economy, already hurt by international sanctions.

III. ACQUISITION OF ARMS AND ARMAMENTS

68. The ever-increasing annual defence budget of the South African régime reflects, among other things, the development of a large internal armaments manufacturing industry as part of its overall plan to make its military-industrial complex "self-sufficient" for its strategic requirements. Even with the financial resources allocated to the production of armaments, however, the régime has not been able to achieve the intended degree of self-sufficiency in the production of arms and ammunition. Although the adoption of Security Council resolution 418 (1977) represented a vital and important first step, South Africa's armed forces still have external sources of supply for much of their main armaments. It is estimated that the régime is still dependent on imports for 25 per cent of its weaponry. The air force is particularly dependent on imported components for maintenance and modernization. The régime claims, however, that it produces 95 per cent of the weapons used by its military, navy and air force. 57/

69. South Africa is able to acquire substantial quantities of vital military equipment, components, spare parts and even plants to manufacture arms and ammunition. A large number of subsidiaries and associates of transnational corporations of major Western and other countries operating in South Africa and Namibia play a vital role in undermining the arms embargo and supply the items required by the armed forces of South Africa and ARMSCOR, its production and procurement agency. The régime is also able to sell military equipment on the international market.

70. As previously reported, since 1977 the Armaments Production Board and the Development and Production Office have been merged under one organization, namely, the Armaments Corporation of South Africa or ARMSCOR, which controls both the production and procurement of armaments and is officially described as an "autonomous State corporation with its own corporate existence", being accountable to the Minister for Defence for its effective performance and to the Chief of SADF for armaments procurement. 58/

71. ARMSCOR has evolved into South Africa's largest industrial organization. The corporation employs 23,000 people directly and an additional 132,000 workers in the private sector and is reported to control 250,000 hectares of land, half of the area controlled by the entire SADF. 51/ It has an asset base of $1.2 billion (R 2.9 billion), which generates a turnover of approximately R 1.6 billion. Sales are reported to have grown from R 52 million in 1969 to R 1,571 million in 1984, representing a 13.3 per cent average rate of growth annually of its supply portfolio. 59/

72. South Africa claims to be among the world's top 10 arms exporters. Arms sales now account for South Africa's third largest export item after gold and coal. In 1987, ARMSCOR claimed to be the country's largest exporter of manufactured goods, selling weaponry worth $900 million to 23 clients world-wide, with expected sales in 1988 to exceed R 3 billion to 32 countries and clients. 60/

73. According to a recent article, "The Development of the South African Military Industrial Complex", published in the journal, Defense Analysis (March 1988), ARMSCOR's supply portfolio bears little relation to the level of the country's defence expenditure, which was R 3.8 billion for the 1984/85 fiscal period. To explain the divergence, the article gives an analysis of the structure of the corporation's operations:

> "The corporation has been given, first and foremost, the responsibility to meet the armaments requirements of the Republic. But, as a supplementary objective, it has also been granted permission to manufacture arms for export purposes. Within the network of ARMSCOR's operations these two activities represent the supply function. The corporative role of the business is the next important area of operation and includes expenditure connected with foreign marketing and 'procurement', financing, personnel, R & D (Research and Development), security, and so forth. The manufacturing aspect marks the final prime area of operational concern. It relates to the capital costs involved in establishing the production processes of ARMSCOR and, where necessary, assisting in the tooling up of private-sector suppliers. The

corporative and manufacturing functions of ARMSCOR account for the R 2.2 billion difference between South Africa's total defence expenditure of R 3.8 billion and the Corporation's R 1.6 billion supply portfolio. The sum in question is, in fact, the charge associated with the nebulous 'Programme Seven', the purchasing of stock for eventual use by other programmes." 61/

74. The close integration of the private sector into the manufacturing operations of ARMSCOR has resulted in an extensive and elaborate system of subcontracting to private companies which produce the disparate range of components and parts which are then submitted to ARMSCOR's nine separate production subsidiaries for final assembly. As illustrated in table 1, the number of firms engaged by ARMSCOR ranges up to 2,200, of which at least 400 would be unable to survive without defence contracts. The importance of the private sector can be gauged by the fact that more than 80 per cent of the funds earmarked for armaments in South Africa is allocated to about 1,000 main contractors and subcontractors. This has led to a situation where private enterprise is responsible for about 70 per cent of the country's defence production. 62/

75. Moreover, since 1977, in accordance with the National Suppliers Procurement Act (1970), the régime can manufacture or produce any goods which the State deems necessary for security; instruct owners or suppliers of goods and services to supply, deliver or sell them to the authorities; and direct any manufacturer to produce or process a specified quantity of goods and to supply them to the authorities. The legislation affected not only the locally owned companies engaged in manufacturing and processing products and material, such as electrical components, motors, telecommunication apparatus and chemicals, all of which might be used in arms production, but also the subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies. Foreign firms and their local subsidiaries in the electronic and engineering sectors are channelling output, data and know-how directly and indirectly to ARMSCOR. 63/

76. ARMSCOR's strategy has been based on the refinement and adaptation of arms and military equipment from designs and blueprints acquired from abroad. Some examples are the Cheetah fighter aircraft, based on the French Mirage, the Olifant, based on the British Centurion tank, and the R-4 rifle, based on the Israeli Galil rifle; several military vehicles of the eight-wheeled, infantry fighting/carrying vehicles of the Ratel family, and the Bulldog mine-resistant vehicle, which was originally produced by Nissan. 64/

77. In updating, upgrading and adapting designs and producing arms and armaments that are derivatives of foreign models, South African arms experts often refer to the weapons capabilities as tested in operation "in the South West African bush country" and state that alterations and modifications on extant foreign models have, "in most cases, been due to weather and geographical conditions in South-West Africa/Namibia".

Table 1. Contractors to ARMSCOR subsidiaries

A. By class

Manufacturing sector	Number	Percentage
Electrical engineering	211	
Chemical engineering	120	
Heavy engineering	106	
Light industry	621	
Shipbuilding and others	25	
Subtotal	1 083	48
Delivery off the shelf*	1 188	52
Total	2 271	100

B. By location

Province or area	Percentage
Transvaal	75
Cape of Good Hope	15
Natal	7
Orange Free State and Northern Cape	3
	100

Source: "The armaments industry in South Africa", ARMSCOR in the Cape, ARMSCOR publication (1984), p. 7.

* This term relates to the outright purchase by ARMSCOR of the standard items of companies' output, such as nuts, bolts, springs and so forth. By contrast, contract production has regard to the manufacture by contractors of specialized components designed solely for the purposes of ARMSCOR's production processes. 62/

78. ARMSCOR boasts that its products are "battle tested in rugged bush country, over vast distances", and that, "thanks to the 21-year-old border war, ARMSCOR can assure customers that everything it produces has been fully product-tested in the most convincing way". 64/ According to press reports, General Joseph Luns, a former Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, visited ARMSCOR facilities recently and stated that he "was very impressed by South Africa's arms production" and that "in the artillery field [South African] ... weapons were more sophisticated than those used by NATO". 65/

79. The high degree of involvement with local industry, especially the technology-producing sector, is an important factor in ARMSCOR's development. These industrial and technological links with the local economy have resulted in a military-industrial symbiosis which is the basis of its comprehensive arms manufacturing platform and adaptation of extant technology for local use. ARMSCOR's products are a result of copying standard designs, and incorporating modifications when required, rather than attempting to evolve "new technology", by this mushrooming military-industrial complex.

80. South Africa's latest reconnaissance system, the "Seeker", a remote-controlled, pilotless aircraft, was among some 150 armaments unveiled at the Feria Internacional de Aire (FIDA 88) held at El Bosque air base near Santiago,

Chile in March 1988. ARMSCOR transported the large quantity of arms, including the massive G-6 howitzer, on the first extended voyage of its recently commissioned SS Drakensberg.

81. According to reports, the "Seeker" system can be transported by truck, and each system comprises at least four remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), a radar set, generators and a ground control station. Its flight capability is reported to be nine hours and it is designed to operate for extensive periods under intense combat conditions. The craft is fitted with stabilized, imported cameras which relay video images of the target to the control station. The target is then attacked by the G-5 howitzer, which can hurl shells a distance of up to 42 kilometres. ARMSCOR is reported to have developed the "Seeker" with Israeli assistance and the aircraft is based closely on the Israeli "Mastiff", according to experts, who also point out that the United States Navy RPV "Pioneer" is closely related. 66/

82. On 21 October 1988, the régime revealed its newest armoured vehicle, called the "Rooikat" (red cat), mounted with a 76-millimetre gun, advertised by South Africa as a fast and highly manoeuvrable vehicle designed to seek and destroy deep in enemy territory, according to Mr. Johan Van Vuuren, ARMSCOR's executive general manager. The eight-wheeled "Rooikat" accommodates a crew of four - commander, driver, gunner and loader - and has an operating range of 1,000 kilometres at speeds of up to 120 kilometres per hour on paved roads, and across bush country at 60 kilometres per hour. Its eight-wheel-drive powers it up gradients as steep as 70 per cent and it can go for 1,000 kilometres on one tank of fuel. The vehicle is reported to be less powerful than a tank but faster and more agile, qualities necessary for the long-range reconnaissance missions common in South Africa's military operations. 67/

83. Lt. Gen. Adreas Liebenberg of South Africa stated at a press conference that the "Rooikat" vehicle would be put into service because it could outmanoeuvre and attack tanks in battle conditions common to southern Africa, where engagements were often at close quarters. ARMSCOR officials refused to disclose the cost or sale price of the "Rooikat" and stated that South Africa had not planned to unveil the "Rooikat" now, but changed its mind when it learned that "one competitor was ready to make a move". 68/ The unveiling of the new armoured vehicle is reported to have been an effort to beat a competing model produced by Italy. Military publications such as Jane's Defence Weekly have stated that the vehicle is well suited to South Africa's needs without being strikingly original, similar to armoured cars produced by Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland. 69/

84. During 1987 and 1988, ARMSCOR widely advertised its G-5 155-millimetre howitzer in military publications. The weapon, costing approximately $1 million, has a range of 42 kilometres using base-bleed, extended-range, full-bore ammunition and is considered to be the only wheeled, self-propelled artillery weapon in the Western world. The G-5 is reported to be based on Canadian and United States aerodynamic research conducted during the 1950s, as well as United States technology acquired covertly during the 1970s from the Space Research Corporation, Vermont. 70/

85. On 11 August 1988, the South African air force unveiled its newest version of the Mirage III, called the Cheetah-E, described as a single-seat, Altech aircraft equipped with an "ultramodern and integrated weapon and navigation system", new electronics and a laser range finder, which promised more accurate weapon delivery. 71/ As reported previously, Israel has been deeply involved in co-operation and collaboration with the Pretoria régime in several areas of weapons development, aircraft production training and direct military involvement. During 1987, South Africa actively sought to employ some 600 former employees of the Israeli aircraft industries who had been laid off following Israel's decision to stop production of its Lavi jet fighter. 72/ More than 50 aeronautical engineers who had been employed on the Lavi arrived in South Africa in November 1987 and were reported to be working on a scaled-down version of the Lavi and on upgrading Mirages into Cheetahs. 73/

86. During 1988, Israeli defence manufacturers such as Israeli Aircraft Industries/Rafael, Tadiran and Bet Shamesh Exgives were expected to lay off approximately 300 staff and South African companies are reported to have been actively trying to recruit them. 74/

87. South African war-planes are reported to have been using Israeli electronic anti-missile weapons and Israel has helped South Africa to convert a Boeing airline into an airborne electronic warfare centre to guide air strikes against Angola in exchange for G-5 155-millimetre howitzers capable of firing nuclear shells. 75/ During South Africa's military invasion and attacks inside Angola, the Cuito River bridge was destroyed by two electronically guided, Israeli-designed drone aircraft. 76/

88. Angolan sources stated that Israel was training 450 UNITA troops at the Kamina military base in Zaire, and SWAPO has attested to the involvement of Israeli military personnel with SADF in Angola, some being engaged in actual fighting in the provinces of Cunene and Cuando-Cubango, 77/ whereas some Israeli technicians were reported to be involved in the jamming of radar, enabling the South African air force to bomb Lubango in southern Angola in late February 1988. Previous reports put the number of Israeli military advisers stationed in Namibia at 200. Israeli military personnel are reported to have been stationed in Namibia since 1973. In 1981, Mr. Ariel Sharon, then Defence Minister of Israel, visited troops in northern Namibia and southern Angola. 78/

89. South Africa's greatest difficulty in countering the international arms embargo has been in the purchase and development of advanced aircraft. The South African military therefore remains deficient in its air force, having neither attack helicopters nor anti-aircraft and anti-tank defences. The biggest problem is a lack of advanced aircraft engine design, to overcome which it has imported Israeli technicians. The régime is reported to have received Austrian spotter planes as well. 79/

90. Conscious of its weakness in the air, South Africa was recently reported to be attempting to purchase more sophisticated weapons systems, e.g., a $5 million radar tracking system manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany by Messerschmidt MBB, to be purchased through British Aerospace. South Africa is reported to have

received the multi-sensor platforms, and part of a battlefield response system under contract with SADF. Several multi-sensor platforms, which can track missiles and grenades, tanks and prepare responses, can be carried over a battlefield by a Transall transport aircraft. The World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, based in Oslo, has appealed to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to stop the transfer of the equipment. 80/ The South African firm Somchem, a subsidiary of ARMSCOR, was invited to the annual international conference on propellants and explosives held in June 1988 by the Fraunhofer Institute in the Federal Republic of Germany. 51/

91. The South African air force currently uses the newly developed pilotless plane, the "Seeker", and a Tellurometer system developed by the firm of Plessey, of the United Kingdom, for use with its G-5 long-range howitzer (used extensively in Angola) as well as a mobile radar system, also produced by the same firm. 81/

92. According to military analysts, South Africa does not possess the expertise and technology to build its own submarines. At present, South Africa has only three French-built Daphne-class submarines to patrol the sea lanes, and these are reported to be in need of major overhaul. 82/

93. As reported previously (A/AC.131/283, para. 54), several reports during 1987 revealed that two shipbuilding firms of the Federal Republic of Germany, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft AG and Ingenieurkontor Lübeck, sold South Africa blueprints and plans for the production of the U-209 diesel-electric submarine for about DM 46 million (about R 52 million or $23 million). 82/

94. In April 1987, South Africa launched its biggest home-produced naval ship, the 12,500-ton Drakensberg, and completed its first Daphne-class upgrade and conversion, carried out at the Simonstown naval dockyard. However, plans to build submarines by the 1990s announced at the time, are reported to have been postponed during 1988. The upgrading and modernizing of its three French-built, Daphne-class vessels acquired during the 1970s have resulted in postponement of the construction of the U-209 submarine with designs acquired from the Federal Republic of Germany during 1984 and 1985 in contravention of the arms embargo. 83/

95. According to The Military Balance 1987-1988, published by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, the financial burden of the war has made its effects felt on SADF in several areas. "The South African Navy has reduced its manpower by 1,500, and despite the commissioning of the locally built support ship, the Drakensberg, the retirement from service of the remaining maritime aircraft, the Shackleton and Wasp, means that the ability of the South African Navy to exert influence on the Cape routes is markedly diminished." 84/

96. South Africa is attempting to make up for the deficiency in other ways. Early in 1988, reports indicated that South Africa has established a secret military base on the small island of Bioko off the coast of Equatorial Guinea. 85/ In April 1988, SADF, it was reported, moved the base from Bioko to Pagalu, a small volcanic outcrop 600 kilometres south of Bioko and close to Angola's Cabinda oil fields. The South African Navy was reported to have used the island as a supply

depot in conjunction with its two-month naval exercise, Operation Magersfontein, during August 1988. 86/

97. In April 1988, South Africa announced the commencement of an urgent five-year programme to launch a communication satellite. Observers believe that the programme, ostensibly for commercial purposes, has military aspects as well and that Pagalu may serve as a tracking station. South Africa is also reported to have built a communication centre on Bioko. In March 1988, rebels involved in a coup attempt against the Government of Sao Tome and Principe were reported to have been trained at Walvis Bay. 87/

98. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South African trade in weapons on the international black markets, especially in the supply of technological information, plans and know-how, is most effective. South Africa has used the black market to circumvent the United Nations arms embargo by acquiring information on technology needed by its large defence industries. This form of technology can be easily concealed and transported, making it ideal for secrecy. 88/

99. A United States citizen, Mr. Thomas Joseph Dolce, was charged in the United States District Court in Baltimore on 11 October 1988 with espionage and the supplying of defence information to the South African Embassy in Washington, D.C. from 1979 to 1983. Mr. Dolce had worked for the Army Material Systems Analysis Activity Unit, which evaluates both domestic and foreign weapons. 89/

IV. SOUTH AFRICA'S NUCLEAR-WEAPON CAPABILITY

100. In addition to its vast military-industrial complex and the most formidable army in Africa, South Africa also possesses a nuclear-weapon capability. The régime's nuclear programme has been developed with the assistance and collaboration of certain Western and other Governments and Israel. Some reports have suggested that the régime has indeed developed and tested nuclear weapons, and that what is not known is only the number of devices and their precise nature. The régime has persistently refused to allow international inspection of its uranium enrichment plants at Valindaba and Pelindaba, which have the capacity to produce weapon-grade uranium. 90/

101. SIPRI states in its 1988 Yearbook, World Armaments and Disarmament, that:

> "... South Africa has to be regarded as a nuclear threshold country and ... its nuclear potential is at the disposal of the white class, whose clock is ticking away. It should be in the interest of all nations not to allow the opportunity to exist for a minority to cause substantial damage not only to South Africa itself but also potentially to the entire region." 91/

102. The large uranium resources that South Africa possesses are an important component of its nuclear capability. The control of Namibian uranium resources enhances South Africa's aggregate share of the international uranium market 92/ and affords it the potential international leverage that such a market share implies.

South Africa's role as a major producer of uranium, which in substantial part comes from Namibia, has not only provided Pretoria with substantial and much-needed foreign exchange earnings but has also given it a formidable advantage in securing extensive support from certain Western countries for its own nuclear programme. For details of the illegal exploitation of Namibia's uranium resources, see the report of Standing Committee II on activities of foreign economic interests operating in Namibia (A/AC.131/313).

103. Although South Africa has been prevented from participating in the annual General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 1979, it still maintains full membership in IAEA and continues to enjoy all the benefits that accrue from such membership.

104. It will be recalled that on 21 September 1987 the President of South Africa announced that the régime was prepared to commence negotiations with each of the nuclear-weapon states on the possibility of "signing" the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and would consider including in those negotiations the topic of safeguards of its installations subject to Treaty conditions.

105. The South African announcement was made on the same day as the opening of the thirty-first session of the IAEA General Conference. The obvious aim of this diplomatic manoeuvre was to thwart a strong move by non-aligned countries, led by Nigeria, that "the rights and privileges of membership be withdrawn" from South Africa, based on two issues: (a) South Africa's occupation of Namibia and its illegal control of Namibia's uranium output; and (b) South Africa's refusal to accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities. Western countries were able to have that decision postponed, based on the announcement by the régime. 93/

106. The régime waited until July 1988 to inform the three signatories to the Treaty, namely the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that it was prepared to enter into discussions during August regarding international inspection of its nuclear installations. 94/

107. On 11 and 12 August 1988, at the request of South Africa, representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics met jointly with representatives of South Africa at Vienna to discuss issues arising from its "consideration of acceding to the Treaty". A wide range of issues was reported to have been discussed, including the obligations arising from various provisions of the Treaty. 94/

108. By its resolution GC(XXXII)/RES/503 of 23 September 1988, the General Conference of IAEA at its thirty-second regular session deferred consideration of South Africa's suspension from the organization to its thirty-third regular session, to be held in September 1989.

109. The Chairman of the Nigerian delegation at the IAEA General Conference stated that South Africa was making diversionary moves in order to hoodwink the international community into believing that it intended to accede to the Treaty and indicated that "the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is open to any

country that wishes to join it. The 136 parties to the Treaty to date took that route. There is nothing in it to negotiate or hold consultations about". 95/

110. SIPRI points out certain ambiguities in the South African announced intentions of signing the Treaty. The Institute states that:

> "First, the Treaty is not subject to signature because it is already in force; it can only be acceded to by a State willing to join it. Second, to become a party to the Treaty, a State need not conduct negotiations with other States, be they nuclear or non-nuclear-weapon states; deposit of the instrument of accession with all or any of the three depositaries (the United States, the United Kingdom or the USSR) would suffice. And third, the question of safeguards under the Treaty must be discussed with the IAEA, not with individual parties; and it goes without saying that an agreement to safeguard South African nuclear activities would have to be similar to those concluded with other non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty, that is, it would have to be comprehensive.
>
> "If by that time South Africa had acquired nuclear weapons, it would have to dismantle them, and the IAEA would have to ensure that all fissionable material in the territory of South Africa was used exclusively for peaceful purposes." 96/

111. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists states that the South African cabinet is divided over the issue and the régime's military planners are not likely to forfeit their nuclear option, especially when changes in the military balance in the region have reduced their advantage so significantly that they have gone to the bargaining table over Namibia and Angola. 97/

V. SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION AGAINST NEIGHBOURING STATES

112. The South African military launched a continuous invasion of Angola from May 1987 until April 1988, code named "Operation Modular" and "Operation Hooper". It was South Africa's biggest invasion since 1976. The régime also admitted for the first time that it was invading Angola in support of UNITA.

113. In January 1988, SADF launched a massive attack on Cuito Cuanavale. The strategic garrison town, which is also a rail centre, is situated approximately 300 kilometres north of the Namibian border in Cuando Cubango province in south-eastern Angola. 98/ The South African military deployed 6,000 infantry and UNITA troops, backed by AML-60, AML-9 and Buffalo armoured cars and Scorpion light tanks. Equipped with long-range G-5 and G-6 howitzers, the South African military bombed the town's airstrip and a bridge over the Cuito River. 99/ White troops of SADF are reported to have fulfilled a logistical and supportive role, e.g., manning the G-5 cannons, rather than a direct combat role in the front lines; whereas the black troops of battalions 32, 101 and 203, made up of Angolan mercenaries and Namibian conscripts, were deployed in the front lines. 100/ Angolan forces fought off the attack and drove SADF 30 kilometres eastward. The battle of Cuito Cuanavale, with South Africa's intervention committing thousands to help Jonas Savimbi, marked a turning point in the protracted war in Angola.

114. At the height of the siege of Cuito Cuanavale in May 1988, the South Africans massed an assault force of more than 10,000 South African and UNITA troops, 300 Olifant tanks and armoured carriers and 400 artillery pieces, mostly G-5 and G-6 howitzers. South Africa thought it had captured Cuito Cuanavale and even took reporters to witness the fall of the town to gain advantage in case of a cease-fire. Before leaving Angola, South Africa worked to consolidate UNITA's control of southern Angola and to attack Namibian refugee camps. SADF did not achieve its objectives, its troops became bogged down and PLAN stepped up its sabotage and other attacks against military installations and South African troop convoys. 101/

115. South Africa lost its air superiority but kept on pounding Cuito Cuanavale with artillery. Angolan forces suffered heavy casualties but inflicted heavier ones on UNITA and SADF soldiers. South Africa lost at least 2 Mirage jets and gained no ground and captured no Angolans. By May, Angolan forces had surrounded some 3,000 to 5,000 South African troops around Cuito Cuanavale who were literally stuck, being bogged down with their heavy equipment. Angolan forces moved south almost within artillery range of the Namibian border, putting South Africa under even greater military pressure. 102/

116. The major battle ended in a critical outcome, i.e., Angolan forces were able to prevent South Africa and UNITA from controlling south-eastern Angola and enabled government forces to launch an offensive that trapped UNITA troops and destroyed major installations. Cuito Cuanavale served as the launching pad to capture Mavinga to the south-east and then Jamba in south-eastern Angola. The fall of Cuito Cuanavale had the significant consequence of persuading the régime to come to the negotiating table and seek a political settlement.

117. From January to March 1988, South African troops also continued to assist UNITA in launching joint attacks against Ondjiva and Mongua in Cunene province and Cuemba, Lubango and Munhango, towns located on the Benguela railroad, in Angola's central Bie and Namibe provinces. The attacks were aimed at capturing strategic points, thereby creating the possibility for UNITA to move north for bases and cause destruction along the Benguela railroad. The South African military deployed up to seven battalions: three regular white and four mixed battalions composed of Namibian, Portuguese and UNITA troops. Angolan forces killed 180 UNITA troops and destroyed large quantities of South African armaments, including two personnel carriers and two jet fighters, which were downed on 20 and 21 February 1988.

118. The International Red Cross reported on the large-scale destruction of Cuemba and the many civilians injured. Angolan counter-attacks, coincident with the rainy season and rugged terrain, reduced the mobility of South African military vehicles and caused long logistical lines. By April it was clear that South African forces had reached an impasse after failing to capture Cuito Cuanavale. The régime began to admit losses in men and arms. The South African Chief of Staff, General Janice Geldenhuys, announced a tactical withdrawal of his troops, and in April had to admit that even the withdrawal had been slowed due to strategic considerations. 103/ By early July, South African troops had only two routes into Angola, one the Riabela-Xamavena road, and the other from Mavinga to Luiana along the Zambian border. South Africa had lost the buffer zone. The only buffer was

between the Cuito and Lomba rivers and the Zambian frontier. However, SADF still had 4,000 troops in Angola. 74/

119. With South African assistance, UNITA concentrated on launching attacks on the Benguela railroad. During January and February 1988, these attacks reduced traffic on the rail line by 90 per cent. The much needed and once lucrative line has been mostly non-productive for a decade. Once the shortest access to the sea not only for exports from Angola but also for copper from Zaire and Zambia, it was rendered inoperative, having been one of UNITA's prime targets. 104/ Mr. Cleofas Silinga, Director General of the Benguela railroad, stated that "UNITA and South Africa have declared an out-and-out war against the Benguela railway", and that rebel attacks over the last 12 years had caused an estimated $2 billion worth of damage to the line. Passenger trains now run regularly only between Lobito and Benguela. Heavily guarded trains, fitted with a special wagon called a mine sweeper, carry food and machinery to the provincial capital of Huambo, and some trains go as far as Bie. But no trains have moved from Bie to Luau on the Zairian border. At least 12 bridges have been destroyed on the eastern section of the line through Moxico province. Lobito was once a bustling port, second only to Luanda and Cabinda. The railroad, known as the "spinal column of the country", handled only 449,000 tons in 1987, compared to its annual capacity of more than 2 million tons in 1974. The attack on the railroad at Munhango had been launched jointly by South Africa and UNITA. 105/

120. On 22 August 1988, a formal cease-fire was signed by Angola, South Africa and Cuba at Ruacana, and a Joint Military Monitoring Commission was established to supervise the cease-fire. On 30 August, South Africa announced its military withdrawal from Angola and was also reported to have massed over 50,000 troops in northern Namibia and to be building additional bunkers for men and aircraft. Since South Africa's withdrawal, Angolan forces recaptured a string of towns held by UNITA, including Munhango in the southern part of the country. 106/

121. Several reports indicate that SADF has been involved in a "massive" illegal ivory racket in the parts of Angola it has invaded over the years. UNITA and South Africa have nearly wiped out the elephants there in order to finance the war. The ivory is reported to be transported through Namibia at Rundu for shipping overseas to several countries. 107/ These reports were made at a United States Congressional sub-committee hearing on United States enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. South Africa was called "one of the largest wildlife outlaws in the world", operating with the complicity of officials at the highest levels. 108/ Jonas Savimbi stated in an interview with the French magazine Paris Match that SADF assistance had been duly repaid by UNITA in ivory and teak. 107/ Reports also state that the same military trucks and planes that carried war matériel into Angola returned with the ivory. The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) has also used ivory poaching to finance its activities. The Weekly Mail (South Africa) of 2 September 1988 stated that close to 100,000 elephants had been slaughtered over the last 10 years. 109/

122. Following its defeat at Cuito Cuanavale, UNITA moved its troops north and was reported to be based largely in Zaire with 60 per cent of its actions being carried out in northern Angola from its supply base at Jamba 970 kilometres to the south.

Angolan military sources stated that United States assistance to UNITA in terms of supplies and training was being provided at six military bases in Zaire, along the border with Angola, at Kitona, Kimpese, Kahemba, Dilolo and Kamina. 110/ The Angolan Government has stated that the United States is assisting UNITA with much more than the $15 million a year claimed by United States officials, and is attempting to disassociate UNITA from South Africa in order to improve its image and to be able to control it directly. On 4 May 1988, United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Chester Crocker, stated in London: "The question of our relationship with UNITA is not a bargaining chip. We have no intention of ending our relationship with UNITA." In a letter dated 6 January 1989, the President-elect of the United States, Mr. George Bush, assured Jonas Savimbi of continued assistance.

123. The South African Minister for Defence, General Magnus Malan, stated at a lecture delivered at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria on 2 November 1988 that South Africa would continue to support UNITA. He further stated: "I see Dr. Savimbi regularly. He does not believe these stories. He says so openly, because he knows that friends - people with the same ideals - do not just walk away from one another. We will not summarily turn our backs on UNITA; one does not treat a good friend like that." 111/

124. During the period under review, South Africa continued to supply and assist the MNR bandits in Mozambique. Reports indicate that since mid-1987, South Africa had moved hundreds of newly trained MNR forces over the border into southern Mozambique. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mozambique stated in early March 1988 that South Africa and MNR were carrying out reconnaissance flights and parachute drops over Mozambican territory and that South Africans were unloading supplies from ships, including anti-aircraft weapons. He further stated: "We monitor their radio transmissions and we have numerous witnesses who testify to having been trained in the Phalaborwa base in South Africa". The latest South African strategy aims to isolate Maputo from the rest of the country. A series of rail and road ambushes have left hundreds of people dead and huge amounts of food destroyed. MNR has in particular targeted skilled civilians in Mozambique, e.g., nurses, teachers and engineers. A particularly reprehensible practice is the use of children, many as young as nine years old, to carry out terrorist acts of sabotage after being drugged or forced to witness horrific acts of torture and mutilation of relatives. 112/

125. In March 1988, Paulo Oliviera, former MNR spokesman in Lisbon from 1984 to 1987, gave details of MNR training at the South African military base at Phalaborwa in the Transvaal and having direct radio communication between his office in Lisbon and Phalaborwa base, complete with the installation of sophisticated electronic equipment by a South African Brigadier, Charles Van Niekerk. He further stated that "hundreds of Mozambicans have been sent to Israel for training". 113/ The Government of Mozambique informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations of a South African attack on 28 July 1988 in Maputo province, during which one South African soldier was killed and war matériel was captured. 114/

126. On 24 June 1988, the President of the Security Council issued a statement on behalf of the members of the Council condemning two related attacks by South

African military personnel, one on 20 June 1988 in Gaborone injuring three policemen and another in Gaborone West on 21 June 1988 causing material damage. 115/ On 28 June 1988, the Botswana Defence Force detained two men connected with a South African commando group that was to conduct a rescue operation of six South African saboteurs being held in Zimbabwe pending trial for murder and other acts of sabotage. The two men identified themselves as ex-servicemen of the Rhodesian army who had later taken up service with the South African security forces.

127. On 5 February 1988, three white Zimbabweans stood trial and confessed to involvement in at least seven incidents of attempted sabotage and attempted assassination since 1981 as well as disclosing plans for future attacks. 116/

128. On 17 May 1988, South African agents set off a bomb in a house used as a hospital by Namibian refugees living in Lusaka, injuring a Zambian woman and causing material damage.

VI. ARMED LIBERATION STRUGGLE LED BY THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION

129. PLAN combatants maintained a continuous military offensive against South African occupation, carrying out sabotage operations in the southern and central parts of Namibia as well; however, most military activity took place in the northern part of the territory. PLAN's activities resulted in continuous military pressure on South African troops even during the dry season. Independent experts have concluded that during 1987 and 1988 SWAPO's military wing was able to carry out a "number of attacks on infrastructural and military targets south of the war zone and succeeded in tying up large numbers of South African troops". SWAPO declared that its war aim was to make South Africa's military presence untenable. Moreover, SWAPO's popular mobilization developed into large scale actions by labour unions and students in particular. 5/

130. Summing up its military activities during 1987, a SWAPO war communiqué of 13 January 1988 stated that PLAN forces had carried out a total of 674 sabotage actions against South African military installations and infrastructure, 58 of them being direct attacks on military bases and posts, during which 981 South African troops had been killed and seven military planes shot down. Of these, three were helicopter gunships, three jet fighters and one a C-130 military transport plane. 117/

131. During the first three months of 1988, PLAN reported attacks on 12 South African military bases. These included bases at Omhedi, 22 kilometres south of Oshikango; Okongo; Onesi; Ohaingu, 37 kilometres north-east of Oshakati; Okalongo, 50 kilometres north-west of Oshakati; Eenhana military base; and the SADF base at Okatope, south-east of Oshikango, inflicting material damage and disruption of communication lines. As a result of those attacks and other combat actions and clashes, more than 250 South African soldiers were reported killed. In addition, PLAN shot down three South African military planes, including a Mirage jet fighter on 22 March 1988 at Oshipanda, 10 kilometres north-east of Ondangua, a Puma

helicopter gunship and one reconnaissance plane, killing an intelligence Major and three others aboard. 118/

132. PLAN forces continued to launch attacks against South African military bases, military outposts, convoys, supply and communications lines and other infrastructure. During the course of these actions, several military vehicles, including Casspir armoured personnel carriers, were destroyed. Major attacks were conducted against the Koevoet base at Ogongo; the Onavivi base west of Oshakati; Ehomba, 35 kilometres south-west of Ruacana. Omhedi, 22 kilometres south-west of Oshikango; and Oshikango and Okalongo. Owing to PLAN attacks on the Ondangua air base and the Ruacana tactical air base, South Africa moved some of its jets, radar systems and ammunition dumps farther south. 119/

133. A member of SWAPO's Military Council, Commander Mushafa Ndilua, stated in Luanda that in the first half of 1988 South Africa had lost 521 troops and had been forced to retreat from and abandon several of its military bases in northern Namibia. 120/

134. SWAPO announced a unilateral cease-fire as of 1 September 1988 in view of the talks then being held between Angola, Cuba and South Africa with the United States as mediator. 121/ On the occasion of the observance of the Week of Solidarity with the People of Namibia and Their Liberation Movement, SWAPO, its President, Sam Nujoma, stated in Luanda on 27 October 1988 that if South Africa or other parties decided to sabotage the current peace process and delay Namibia's independence, SWAPO would have no choice but to resume the armed national liberation struggle. 122/

135. On 22 December 1988, the Governments of Angola, Cuba and South Africa signed an agreement in New York requesting the Secretary-General to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) on 1 April 1989 and providing for all South African military forces to depart from Namibia in accordance with resolution 435 (1978). 123/

136. By its resolution 632 (1989) of 16 February 1989, the Security Council approved the report of the Secretary-General and his explanatory statement for the implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibia and decided to implement its resolution 435 (1978) in its original and definitive form to ensure conditions in Namibia which would allow the Namibian people to participate freely and without intimidation in the electoral process under the supervision and control of the United Nations, leading to early independence of the Territory. 124/

137. In his further report of 30 March 1989, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that South Africa and SWAPO through letters dated 21 March 1989 and 18 March 1989, respectively, had confirmed their agreement to abide by the formal cease-fire as of 0400 hours Greenwich mean time on 1 April 1989. 125/

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UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL FOR NAMIBIA

SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN NAMIBIA

Report of Standing Committee II

Chairman: Mr. Shaukat UMER (Pakistan)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. In the exercise of its mandate as the legal Administering Authority for Namibia until independence, the United Nations Council for Namibia maintains under constant review the social conditions in Namibia as well as the progress in the social sphere of the struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia.

2. The present progress report, which was prepared in accordance with paragraph 12 (b) of General Assembly resolution 43/26 C of 17 November 1988, updates the previous report on the social conditions in Namibia (A/AC.131/285).

II. APARTHEID IN NAMIBIA

3. The racist régime of South Africa has extended its abhorrent apartheid system to Namibia, despite the universal condemnation of that system as a crime against humanity and a grave threat to international peace and security. This extension was made in defiance of the United Nations, which has assumed special responsibility for the Territory.

A. South Africa's "bantustanization" of Namibia

4. The racist régime of South Africa designed its grand apartheid plan of separate development for Namibia in 1964. In defiance of United Nations resolutions and contrary to the wishes and aspirations of the Namibian people, the Pretoria régime created a "Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs" (the Odendaal Commission) and subsequently published the so-called Odendaal plan for the fragmentation of the Territory into a number of poverty-stricken "homelands" for blacks. 1/ More than 60 per cent of the land in Namibia is owned and controlled by whites who constitute only 6.6 per cent of the 1.5 million people. Most of the whites have large freehold commercial farms. The African majority is forced to live in overcrowded homelands. Others, such as the San people of Namibia who make up 2.9 per cent of the population, have been threatened with total dispossession. 2/

5. More recently, South Africa's policy of social and racial fragmentation of Namibia was made explicit in the so-called Proclamation AG 8 of 1980, which divides Namibian society into 11 separate and mutually exclusive groups on the basis of racial, ethnic and tribal origins (see A/AC.131/130, para. 8). This policy, aimed at preventing the African majority from organizing and acting in unison against South African domination, is a more lethal version of the long-standing colonial strategy of "divide and rule". It also helps to maintain a pool of cheap black labour for South African and other foreign economic interests operating illegally in Namibia, as well as for the local white settlers.

6. Proclamation AG 8 specifically provides for racially segregated local government based on ethnicity. These so-called second-tier authorities are largely

dependent for income on taxes raised from their own communities; personal income tax by whites is paid to the so-called white second-tier authority. 3/ This segregated structure also means that the white minority has been able to maintain all the best hospitals, schools and residential areas as exclusive white preserves. 4/

7. South Africa's attempt to fragment the Territory has encountered the resolute resistance of the Namibian people and the condemnation of the international community. The consequences of Pretoria's deliberate policies of social and racial fragmentation of the Namibian people, in violation of international law and morality and in defiance of United Nations decisions, are examined below.

B. Education

8. The system of "Bantu education" officially extended to Namibia is designed to perpetuate white supremacy. Education for blacks in Namibia is based on the premise that they are to be trained for the subservient jobs allocated to them under the colonial economy. The initial stages of education in Namibia are under the control of the so-called second-tier (ethnic) governments, most of which are in no position to finance public schooling for the Territory's children.

9. After decades of apartheid which resulted in the development of separate educational facilities and dictated that expenditures on white schools far exceed those on black schools, the differences between the two systems are glaring. White schoolchildren enjoy a modern and comprehensive educational system. Educational facilities for black children, however, are non-existent in some areas and in others, mediocre at best. There are differences in school facilities, classroom practices, teacher-training programmes, teachers' salaries, teacher-pupil ratios and in the amount of money spent per pupil per year. As regards the latter, available information indicates that some R 1,210 5/ per year is spent on each white pupil, 6/ R 300 on a "coloured" pupil and R 232 on a black pupil. 7/

10. Elementary school is compulsory and free for whites between the ages of 6 and 16. It is not compulsory for black children, who must also pay for their education. There are only a few schools for blacks and very few teachers in black schools. This has led to overcrowded classrooms, with pupils totalling up to 80 per class. The teacher/school ratio is 6.9:1 in black schools and 16.8:1 in white schools. Schools for senior level students make up less than 10 per cent of the total number of schools throughout the country. There is only one post-high school educational institution and not a single university.

11. The language of instruction in the schools is an important issue for Namibians. Despite repeated demands by the Namibian people that English, one of the three official languages (the others are German and Afrikaans), be the medium of instruction in schools, Afrikaans remains largely the language of instruction. Afrikaans is not spoken anywhere in the world outside of South Africa and Namibia. It is also seen by the black majority as the language of their oppressors and this has contributed to the relatively poor progress of many pupils. Black teachers in Namibia, through the Namibia Professional Teachers Organization, organized English

orientation courses for primary school teachers in a determined effort to implement English as a medium of instruction in primary schools. 8/ The Namibian people are rejecting increasingly the Bantu educational system imposed on them by the illegal South African régime.

12. The illegal administration has kept schools totally segregated. Many white schools are half empty and some, as in the case of Karibib, closed down because there were no white children. Similarly, the so-called white administration's Teacher's Training College continues to register fewer students than it is capable of taking in; the college is reportedly capable of accommodating 2,000 students. Only 35 new teachers registered in 1988, 42 per cent less than the previous year. A R 30 million complex, the college has never been used to its full capacity. The college's primary function, according to its academic registrar, is to provide well-qualified teachers for white schools. Libraries are also segregated - the Windhoek Library, for instance, is exclusively for whites.

13. The lack of educational facilities and qualified teachers has resulted in the dominant socio-economic and political ideology which prevents blacks from successfully challenging the privileged minority in the labour market. Because the future of an independent Namibia is dependent on the education and preparation of its younger generation for future challenges, South Africa has made several attempts to disrupt and to destroy all possibilities of the African majority obtaining a good education in Namibia. "Bantu education" has ensured not only inferior education but also poor examination results. Further, poor living conditions and other economic pressures, such as supporting their families, have forced students to join the work-force before completing high school. A good number of students are expelled because of their opposition to the illegal occupation of their country by South Africa and their support for the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

14. South Africa has increasingly militarized the schools as part of its programme of intimidation, indoctrination and conscription. Soldiers have been introduced into schools as teachers. As a matter of policy, soldiers carry their arms, fully exposed, to the classrooms. Replacing teachers with soldiers is also an attempt to indoctrinate black children and to spread tribal hatred through propaganda, geared towards masking the true identity and aims of the South African occupier.

15. Certain organizations such as Ezuva, Etango and the "Veldskool" which posed as "cultural organizations" in schools were, in reality, extensions of the South African military waging a vicious indoctrination campaign. SWAPO is portrayed as a "terrorist" organization against which an organized "counter-insurgency" force is necessary to maintain "stability". The true identity of these "cultural organizations" was disclosed at the annual conference of the Vaalgras Youth Association. The Association, which is a non-tribal organization striving towards genuine independence, stated in its resolutions that it would reject military conscription and support progressive organizations. 9/ Schools have increasingly been used as recruiting grounds for the army. The Chairman of the so-called administration for "coloureds" appeared before the South African Defence Force (SADF) Board of Enquiry in May 1988 for allegedly divulging "certain confidential information concerning the South African troops' involvement in schools". The

information allegedly pertained, among other things, to logistic aid to schools affording cadet training. The so-called administration for "coloureds" had already decided that cadet training at schools under its jurisdiction should cease and that parents of the affected pupils had the right to be informed.

16. The growing military intervention in the educational system is reflected in the continuous conflicts in schools and other educational institutions between the South African troops and students. Schools became the battleground in the north of Namibia where SADF bombed or burned down at least 13 schools. 10/ In one case, footprints led back to a South African military base. 11/ In another case, "Koevoet", the notorious police death squad was reported to be channelling arms to students and teachers in order to promote a "civil war" situation and to undermine SWAPO. 12/

17. South African military planners have built their bases near and around schools and hospitals to discourage SWAPO attacks against these bases and to ensure that innocent pupils are caught in the cross-fire of any fighting and that SWAPO gets the blame. Students have previously been hurt in South African retaliatory actions after the latter clashed with SWAPO freedom fighters. For instance, two female students were killed at Ponhofi Secondary School in northern Namibia when a mortar shell fired from the nearby South African military base hit the school, ripping the roof of the girls' dormitory. Albertina Nghikongelwa, 15 years old, was killed instantly and Victoria Ngkikofa, 18 years old, died a few days later. 13/

18. Mobilization against the building of military bases near schools began to grow in 1987, reaching its peak in June 1988. The Namibia National Students Organization (NANSO), which is fighting for equal, free and democratic education for all Namibian students, is an ardent advocate of the removal of military bases near schools.

19. In March 1988, NANSO launched the biggest school boycott ever in the country. The boycott kept 75,000 school-goers as well as teachers out of the classrooms. The police began to break up parent-pupil meetings. 13/ Namibian women met with the local authorities to protest the presence of the military bases near schools and vowed to encourage their children to go and fight alongside SWAPO if the bases were not removed.

C. Health

20. As previously reported (A/AC.131/285, para. 33), the health sector in Namibia is inextricably linked to the apartheid system imposed by South Africa and is consequently characterized by gross inequalities and by emphasis on curative medicine over preventive services. Health services for the black majority are either rudimentary or virtually non-existent, while the network of health facilities and services available to whites is comparable to that of the best in any country.

21. Racist South Africa's policies of racial fragmentation and mandatory inferior living conditions for the blacks are major underlying causes of the wide disparity

in the health conditions of blacks and whites in Namibia. Whites are almost invariably assured of better housing, clean water, sewage disposal and less stressful working conditions. Blacks, on the other hand, are forced to live in squalid and unhygienic conditions in the impoverished "homelands". The few blacks allowed into the urban areas in order to serve as cheap labour live in overcrowded accommodations. The working and living conditions of workers in Namibia are similarly characterized by inequalities between blacks and whites. Poor living and working conditions have imposed their toll on the black community. The majority of black workers are compelled to live in cramped, segregated, single-sex dormitories with little sanitation.

22. Each "homeland" usually has one state hospital, which serves as the main referral hospital, and a few mission hospitals, all of which are poorly funded and chronically understaffed. For example, a 400- to 500-bed hospital may have only one or two doctors. 14/

23. Many of the prevalent diseases are associated with malnutrition and are the direct consequence of abject poverty, overcrowded living conditions and an unsanitary environment, all of which contribute to the spread of disease among black people. Such diseases include bubonic plaque, tuberculosis, meningitis, gastro-enteritis, measles, diarrhoeal diseases, typhoid fever, malaria and respiratory tract infections in children. The incidence of measles throughout Namibia was reported to have been appalling and, in some areas, to have reached epidemic proportions.

24. Children are the most affected section of the population because of their tender age and the lack of preventive medicine, particularly vaccination, for the black majority in the rural areas. There are an estimated 70,000 children under the age of 5 who are under the care of the so-called Department of National Health and Welfare. Although immunization has allegedly been part of health services, the Department has only recently adopted the Extended Programme of Immunization recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1987. According to the Department, only 23,000 children were presented for vaccination during that year. 15/ The process had lasted for one week. Over two thirds of the children had not been reached during the vaccination campaign.

25. Infant mortality among blacks was 163 per 1,000 lives births, compared with 21 per 1,000 live births for whites. 16/ Life expectancy at birth is 43 years for blacks and 70 for whites. 17/ Two of the biggest killers among children are gastro-enteritis and measles. Incidence of the potentially fatal bilharzia disease along the Cuando River in Eastern Caprivi was nearly 100 per cent, according to a local survey. Some 5,000 people were treated after an anonymous overseas donor agreed to supply the necessary funds; controlled chemical poisons have been used against bilharziasis-carrying snails. 18/

26. The racist labour laws do not, as a matter of principle, require occupational health and safety facilities. Thus, beyond the nominal first aid coverage, black workers have no medical protection. Neither are they accorded any of the fringe benefits enjoyed by their white colleagues. While whites enjoy automatic membership of the medical aid scheme, blacks have to apply after one year of

service and only blacks in the intermediate employment category, which is a small fraction of the entire black labour force, are qualified to apply for membership.

27. At Rössing, black mine workers are forced to live at the mining site in the township of Arandis, which the company has built. As a consequence, they are constantly exposed to the highly toxic dust particles from the uranium tailings. Moreover, the ore tailings left in the process of recovering uranium oxide are dumped in heaps. The heaps are carried into the air and the nearby Omaruru River by wind and water erosion. White workers, on the other hand, live in Swakopmund, a beautiful coastal town over 70 kilometres from the mine site. While whites receive regular health checks, no similar scheme exists to monitor the exposure of blacks to radiation or to pick up the early effects thereof.

28. The fact that the racist régime of South Africa has repeatedly refused to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to visit the Rössing mine raises serious suspicions that conditions at the mine and the surrounding area do not meet international standards of safety for the protection of the workers and the environment against the harmful effects of radiation. The absence of proper safety standards has led to a high risk of radiation-related diseases such as tuberculosis and skin and lung cancer among uranium and other mine workers, and at the same time threatens future generations of Namibians with genetic deficiency. There are reports of increasing heart defects in newly born babies in northern Namibia, where most of the mine workers come from.

29. Similarly, Tsumeb mine has radiation and pollution problems caused by toxic sulphuric acid. In the past, workers at the mine were found to have had this toxic substance in their blood, yet regular medical check-ups have not been instituted at the mine. 19/

30. The pattern of disease and sickness engendered by the poor living and working conditions of blacks in Namibia is exacerbated by the systematic policy and acts of repression being carried out by the South African occupation régime against the Namibian people, who are demanding their right to freedom and self-determination. Health services continue to deteriorate. Mission hospitals have been closed and foreign doctors and nurses deported by the illegal administration in Namibia. One such recent case was the seizure of a church hospital, St. Antonius Catholic Hospital, in the coastal town of Swakopmund, where the medical staff was sent out of the country and the church was forced to close the hospital down. Similarly, the Anglican Church was forced to close down the Odibo hospital near the Angolan border due to constant harassment by South African troops. Patients frequently stay away from hospitals for fear of harassment by the police and army, particularly if the latter is the cause of the patients's injury. Doctors and nurses have occasionally been attacked, detained and tortured for attending to the health needs of the Namibian people. Hospitals have frequently been raided by the police or army.

31. In northern Namibia where half of the population lives, security legislation has restricted the ability of health workers and medical staff to carry out their duties. A dusk-to-dawn curfew imposed eight years ago continues in force. The

sick and the injured cannot be taken to hospitals at night because the army is under a standing order to shoot on sight and to ask questions later. Under this provision, social and religious functions have been curtailed and many lives have been cut short.

D. Living conditions

32. As in all other aspects of life, the living conditions of black Namibians are determined on the basis of apartheid policies of racial fragmentation and racist laws. Housing, for example, is governed by discriminatory laws such as the Native Urban Areas Proclamation Act of 1951, which regulates the residences of the Namibian people in urban areas. Black Namibians are forced to live in townships geographically separated from whites.

33. The shortage of housing poses a serious problem. Housing provided by the occupation régime for black Namibians in the townships is exceptionally inadequate. The houses are uniformly patterned after standards and specifications used by all state housing for blacks in South Africa. Many household sizes vary from 5 to 16 persons, resulting in overcrowded conditions.

34. In some parts of southern and northern Namibia, settlements have been erected around the towns as a result of the refusal of the illegal administration to address the housing needs of blacks. In the northern "homelands", squatter camps have been erected around the emerging commercial centres of Oshiele, Okatana and Upindi. In the south, the most run-down squatter camp was formed around the town of Rehoboth to accommodate those who could not afford the rent and were thus forcibly removed. Sanitary facilities are practically non-existent, thereby creating conditions for the rapid growth of epidemics, particularly during heavy rains and floods.

35. The living conditions of the African majority in the "homelands" are deplorable. Life in the "homelands" is mainly based on subsistence farming. Households do not have sufficient cash to buy building materials with which to build decent houses or to improve the existing ones.

36. The migration of black Namibians is due not only to their quest for employment, but also to their forced removal from their homes by the South African régime. Some of the major objectives for removing blacks forcibly from their traditional localities are to facilitate the movement of the racist military machinery in Namibia; to undermine the growing armed resistance of the Namibian people; and to intensify South Africa's aggression against the neighbouring States. These mass removals underscore the most brutal and inhuman aspect of the apartheid system imposed by South Africa since they entail usurpation, expropriation and dispossession of the land of the Africans. The continued removals also cause total disruption of the people's lives and the abandonment of communities and institutions that have taken generations to build.

Status of women

37. Under the apartheid system as practised in South Africa and applied to Namibia, black women have largely been confined to the "homelands" and constitute the most oppressed section of the population. In the absence of able-bodied men who are forced to seek employment as cheap migrant labourers in the white economy, women are expected to meet the subsistence needs of the members of the household constituted by the young, the old, the sick and the unemployed.

38. The subsistence base of the African majority is small-scale agriculture, the viability of which has been persistently undermined by apartheid policies and discrimination. The wages earned through migrant labour are insufficient to support a modern family, let alone the traditional African extended family. Without the back-breaking subsistence economy primarily carried out by women in the "homelands", the black family would be unable to sustain itself. Consequently, through its exploitation of black migrant labour, the white economy is indirectly subsidized by the unpaid labour provided by women in the "homelands".

39. Aside from being subjected to all apartheid evils that affect black Namibians, Namibian women, on the sole basis of their gender, are made victims of oppression. One particular development that has caused concern among the Namibian people is the increased recourse by the State to the drug Depo-Provera as a contraceptive among black women. Depo-Provera is a synthetic version of the female hormone progesterone. After years of testing, the United States Government Food and Drug Administration did not approve the drug for contraception because of evidence that it caused cancer in animals (see also A/AC.131/285, para. 41).

40. The illegal administration in Namibia has women injected with Depo-Provera soon after labour has ended. Consequently, the drug is also consumed by the infant during breast-feeding. The drug, which is used only on black women, is often administered without prior consent, medical examination or explanation of the drug's many side effects.

41. The illegal administration has also introduced Depo-Provera in its family planning programme in black hospitals and in secondary schools where teenagers are injected with the drug allegedly to prevent teenage pregnancies. Moreover, white farmers inject black female workers with the drug and state hospitals have prescribed it to women suffering from tuberculosis as treatment for the disease. The widespread use of Depo-Provera has caused a great deal of fear among Namibians that the drug may be used as a political weapon to control and curb black population growth.

42. Apart from its cancer-causing potential, Depo-Provera has the following side effects: blood clots, heart attacks and strokes as well as problems of the liver and eyes. The drug is also known to cause changes in appetite, excessive weight gain, swelling of the ankles and feet, and unusual tiredness or weakness.

Namibian children

43. In its attempt to suppress the resistance of the Namibian people, the racist SADF has unleashed a war of attrition against Namibian children whom it believes

to be more radical than the older generation and therefore potential recruits of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). 20/ SADF has sought refuge among Namibian children by building its military bases around schools. As a result, many children have been wounded and killed by stray bullets or by deliberate retaliatory action against them whenever the military bases were attacked by SWAPO. Also common is the army's propaganda and brain-washing campaign among children aimed at winning their "hearts and minds" by recruiting them as informers even against their own families and by conscripting them into the racist army. Children suspected of being sympathetic to SWAPO have been abducted, raped, tortured and murdered in cold blood.

44. The rape of schoolchildren, including children as young as eight years old, has been on the increase during the period under review. On 23 October 1988, for instance, two Zulu-speaking members of SADF broke into the homestead of Mr. Kevanku in northern Namibia. The two men, one armed and dressed in military uniform and the other in civilian clothes, apparently came from the nearby Eenhana Military Base. They entered the bedroom of two youngsters, Rosalia, aged 8 and Mirjam, aged 10 and raped them. The incident took place at about 1.30 a.m. Although the two men were subsequently held by the local authorities, no charges were brought against them. Those responsible for such atrocities in Namibia have not, in many cases, been brought before the court because of the wide indemnity which the so-called South Africa Defence Act and the Proclamation AG 9 grant to the army in Namibia. 21/

45. In another instance, the Magistrate Court cleared the leader of a "Koevoet" unit from criminal liability for the death of Marcelina Silas, a two-year-old toddler who was crushed and killed by Casspir armoured vehicles on 10 June 1987. The Magistrate Court found that group leader Stephanus Oosthuizen, aged 28, was "acting in the execution of his duties" when he ordered the driver of an armoured personnel carrier to plough through a fully occupied homestead in the village of Onawa in northern Namibia. 22/

46. The Conference on Children, Apartheid and Repression in Namibia, held in London on 27 October 1988, heard evidence of criminal atrocities committed by the apartheid army and police in Namibia. The Conference, inter alia, heard testimony that in January 1987 Johannes Shivute, 19 years old, was run over by an armoured Casspir. No charges were brought against the criminal perpetrators. 23/

47. The atrocities committed by South African troops in Namibia take various forms and people, particularly children, live in constant fear for their lives. Some are killed by stepping on live ammunition left recklessly on the road by the occupation army; others, particularly the very young, are killed by live explosives left either on their premises or in public places. On 8 July 1988, two pupils, approximately 10 and 11 years of age died instantly when they accidentally stepped on a live shell which the racist army had left on the road. 24/ In another incident, Sarah Mpingana Amukoto, 12 years old, and Fillemon Kaondoka, 18 years old, died instantly on 23 September 1988 when a device which two younger children had brought home to play with, exploded; the device had been left in the field by South African soldiers who had stopped under the trees to eat. Sarah and Fillemon, who had realized that the device could be dangerous, had seized it from the younger

children and were trying to throw it over the fence when it fell short, hitting the fence and exploding within the homestead, killing them and wounding the younger children. The incident occurred at Omusheshe village near Ongwediva. 25/

48. Young children are exposed to food poisoning as a result of eating biscuits, sweets and tinned foodstuff given to them by the racist army. In the Ongandjera district of northern Namibia, cases have been reported of children who developed swollen stomachs after having eaten food from the soldiers. 26/

49. It has been reported that more and more cases are being diagnosed as high blood pressure which, until recently, hardly existed among the population of the north. The so-called Ovambo administration has reported that both young and old have been found to be suffering from high blood pressure as a result of the mental and physical tension created by war. More and more homeless children in Namibia are appearing on the streets due to long-term detentions, alcoholism, split families, and, particularly, as a result of the migrant labour system and the protracted war. 27/

III. REPRESSION AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

50. In a desperate attempt to suppress the struggle of the Namibian people against colonialism, apartheid, oppression and exploitation, South Africa has continued to repress the people of Namibia and has enacted a great number of repressive measures aimed at brutally intimidating and terrorizing the Namibian people.

A. Repression

51. On 7 September 1988, at Uutsima in the Uukwaambi district, Mr. Simon Willibard, 21, was beaten up by members of the South African army during "questioning". He was slapped, punched with fists and kicked in his face. When his father tried to intervene, tear-gas was fired at him. Simon sustained injuries to his mouth and various other abrasions and contusions. He was hospitalized for four days as a consequence of the assault.

52. Mr. Elias Iipinge, 39, from Ongandjera, was assaulted by 10 members of the racist occupationist forces in Namibia who came to his work place on 14 September 1988. When he responded negatively to queries on the whereabouts of SWAPO combatants, they assaulted him with fists, after stealing items from the shop where he worked.

53. On 20 September 1988, at 7 p.m., three Casspirs carrying about 30 members of the occupationist army came to the house of Mrs. Emma Uupindi, 58, of Uukwaluudhi. The men ordered everybody out of the cuca shop next to her house and started beating the people at random. Mrs. Emma Uupindi too was beaten with a palm branch, all over her body.

54. Mrs. Tabitha Shilamba, 34, and Mrs. Lahiya Eliakim, 28, of the Ongha area in northern Namibia, were repeatedly raped by members of the racist forces of occupation on 21 September 1988. 28/

55. Mr. Michael Hidinwa, an inspector in the "Koevoet" murder squad unit of the racist forces in Oshakati, northern Namibia, deserted the unit on 25 September 1988 and fled to Angola in a South African Casspir combat vehicle. Mr. Jonas Kemanya, 23, another member of the "Koevoet" terrorist squad in Namibia, decided to quit on 27 September 1988. Both said that they were under South African orders to terrorize innocent Namibian civilians and to discredit SWAPO. 29/

56. On 29 September 1988, Mr. Paul Kalenga, Secretary-General of NANSO, and Mr. Martin Mbinga were seriously injured by the South African police while marking the tenth anniversary of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978. Both were hospitalized. The Secretary-General of NANSO sustained internal injuries, while Mbinga had a fractured skull and injuries to his right hand and knee. 30/

57. Also on 29 September, two members of the racist occupationist forces arrived at the home of Mrs. Bernadine Shiimbashike, 62, at Ombalantu. They asked for money and threatened to shoot her if she did not give them the money. The men then demanded to be taken into the cuca shop next to her home where they searched for money.

58. On the same day, members of the racist forces of occupation in Namibia were involved in a so-called shooting exercise near the house of Mrs. Aina Kiya, an elderly woman of Emono. One of the rockets struck her house kiling five inhabitants.

59. On 10 October 1988, arson destroyed the offices of The Namibian, the only independent newspaper in Windhoek. Computer equipment and other materials worth thousands of dollars were destroyed. The Namibian has been very critical about Pretoria's reign of terror in Namibia. Consequently, its offices have been attacked frequently by South African agents.

60. Mr. Festus Nandjigwa of Oshakati was arrested by members of the South African army on 31 October 1988 while working at the Iipumbu Restaurant in Oshakati. To date, no word has been received about his whereabouts nor was any reason given for his detention by the authorities.

61. Three teachers of Uuhwa school near Omuthitugwonyana, northern Namibia, were beaten up by members of the "Koevoet". They tore to pieces the May Day T-shirts they were wearing and left them half naked in front of their classes. The "Koevoet" bandits also chased pupils away from combined schools of Onanghonda, Ondeihaluka, Oshekasheka and Okapombo, all situated in northern Namibia.

62. Armed soldiers of the South African occupation forces canvass villages in northern Namibia, writing down the names, identification numbers, addresses and political party affiliation of people. The occupation forces torture those they suspect of being sympathizers of SWAPO. 31/

63. The confrontation between students and the occupation régime continued through 1988. A number of schools remained shut down by the strike, and student activists were victimized by South African police and troops. According to Namibian Press

Agency sources, among the students detained in Walvis Bay were Sebedeus Luanda, 24; Joseph Luanda, 19; Ismael Luanda, 16; Andreas Shipondo, 23; Lucas Johannes; Jacky Munali and Jacob Silvanus. Three other students were arrested at Caprivi Senior Secondary school on 23 October 1988. The students, Jimmy Kwala, Franco Munali, and Dion Hiskia, a Council of Churches in Namibia student in Katima Mulilo, have been charged with trespassing for allegedly having been found on the premises of another school. They are being held under the so-called AG 170, the "illegal gatherings act". 32/

64. South African troops shot at a mother and her three children from a helicopter gunship. The army headquarters claimed that the two children had died as a result of cross-fire. In another incident, an 11-year-old girl was stabbed in the neck by soldiers at Ohaingu village when four trucks of SADF members stopped and questioned several children about the whereabouts of PLAN guerrillas. 30/

65. Two SWAPO officials in the town of Rundu in north-eastern Namibia were detained by the South African occupation army. Mr. Nimurod Muremi, SWAPO Branch Chairman for Rundu and Mr. Raphael Dinyando were picked up by the occupation army in the early hours of 9 November 1988.

B. Repressive legislation

66. Since 1967, the South African régime has enacted a series of laws calling for harsh penalties, including death sentences, life imprisonment and long-term prison sentences, aimed at thwarting the legitimate national liberation struggle of the Namibian people. These acts give the South African colonial police and occupation forces absolute power to carry out mass arrests, to commit murder, to ban organizations and publications opposed to Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia and to detain or deport Namibians without trial. They also provide for preventive detention, the banning of meetings, the imposition of martial law and the establishment of "security districts" in order to stifle the political struggle of the Namibian people under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative. Moreover, the South Africa Defence Act and the Proclamation AG 9 indemnify members of the South African army from liability for actions taken in the execution of their duty. Also, the State President may suspend any legal proceedings under the Act in the interest of national security.

67. According to the so-called Security Districts Proclamation Act imposed by the occupation régime in March 1985, journalists, foreign visitors and church people who were not residents of the six areas covered by the Act cannot enter the designated "security districts" without permits from the South African occupation army and police force. The districts cover more than half of Namibia's territory, from the capital city of Windhoek to the northern border with Angola, Botswana and Zambia. More than three quarters of the Namibian population live in this area. The Act is intended to restrict the Namibian people's freedom of movement and to give the "Koevoet" and other South African murder units a free hand to commit atrocities without public exposure.

68. A few days after the installation of the so-called interim government in Namibia, South Africa's Draconian laws were extended to the Territory. These

include: (a) the Intimidation Act, specifically drawn up to deal with election boycotts; (b) the Demonstrations in or near Court Buildings Prohibition Act, used to suppress protest at political trials; and (c) the Protection of Information Act. These laws are now part of the instruments used to continue the repression of the Namibian people.

69. Both the United Nations Council for Namibia and the General Assembly have strongly condemned and rejected the latest imposition of military conscription on all males between 17 and 55 years of age to serve in the colonial army. The Council supports the right and indeed the duty of Namibians to resist military conscription imposed on them by the illegal occupation régime.

C. Terrorization of the general population

70. Atrocities are committed daily by murder squads of "Koevoet", also known as the so-called Counter Insurgency Unit (COIN), and by squads which pose as "cultural organizations" known as "Takkies", "Etango" and "Veldskool" in various regions. These groups were formed by the racist South African troops in Namibia and are being used politically to mobilize the masses against SWAPO.

71. The reign of terror in Namibia has been confirmed by several factual descriptions compiled by lawyers, church bodies and humanitarian organizations and by sworn affidavits, regarding the systematic use of torture and brutality by the South African army and police.

72. SWAPO compiles lists of names of people who are known to have been murdered by the forces of the racist régime, or who have been described as "missing", usually after having been arrested. In many instances, the word "missing" means that such people have been secretly killed by the South African occupation forces. SWAPO has also provided detailed testimony indicating that while in detention, many of its members and supporters have been subjected to torture.

73. The most common forms of torture include the application of electric shocks to all parts of the body. Psychological torture is also commonly practised since, from the point of view of the occupation régime, it has the advantage of leaving no physical traces. Detainees are also reportedly threatened with death unless they renounce their membership in, or their support of, SWAPO and agree to collaborate with the racist régime, often by being forced to sign prepared statements. Church sources have warned that the level of violence of the apartheid system in Namibia has risen to new heights, and that ordinary Namibians are in greater danger than ever before.

74. The South African-installed interim government banned all commemorations in Namibia of United Nations Human Rights Day and Namibian Women's Day, both of which fall on 10 December. In Namibia, 10 December has been a day of mourning since 1959, when South African police killed 13 women and wounded more than 100 others during their forced removal to Katutura and Khomasdal townships outside Windhoek. 33/ Such incidents, involving constant attacks on the Namibian people by South African forces and their agents, now represent the nightmarish reality of daily life for Namibians.

75. Namibian youths addressing the Conference on Children, Apartheid and Repression in Namibia, held in London on 27 October 1988, gave eyewitness and personal accounts of rape, murder and torture by South African troops in Namibia. Official statistics of political detainees under Proclamation AG 9, one of a series of South Africa's repressive laws in Namibia, totalled 5,507 people between 1977 and 1983. Only eight of those detained were ever charged. Namibian youths said that the statistics were severe but underestimated because of incomplete records kept by the South African police and army in Namibia. Erastus Haitengela, aged 16, told the Conference that the soldiers hunted students down like "hungry wolves tracking lost sheep". He said that the soldiers, whether drunk or sober, had come into their schools from their bases to beat, detain, harass and torture schoolboys because they did not want to join the racist army. He said that some soldiers had come as bogus SWAPO fighters to rape girls.

76. At the Namibian Hearings, convened at Washington from 2 to 4 May 1988, Miss Patricia McClurg, President of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States, testified before the international panel of distinguished persons that Ignatius Nambodi, a 29-year-old Catholic mission worker detained by South African authorities on 2 February 1988 and found dead in his cell 20 days later, was never allowed a visit by a lawyer, a member of the clergy or even his family.

77. At the 515th meeting of the United Nations Council for Namibia, on 6 May 1988, Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, informed the Council of the 16 schools that had been destroyed in the north-western and north-eastern areas of Namibia. He said that the "South West African Territorial Force" (SWATF) was empowered to kill people and destroy property.

78. At the same meeting, the international panel composed of the Rev. Karl Mau of the World Council of Churches; Mrs. Lisbeth Palme, widow of the late Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme; Mr. Howard Cooke, former Minister of Public Affairs of Jamaica; Mr. James Mutambira of the World Council of Churches; and Mr. Damu Smith of the Washington Office on Africa, apprised the Council of the testimony they had heard at the Namibian Hearings. Rev. Mau, speaking on behalf of the panelists, informed the Council that the Terrorism Act passed by South Africa represented the most vicious form of terrorism. He said that witnesses at the Hearings had presented evidence of the most brutal form of terrorism. People had been subjected to nine years of curfews and women had been deprived of any assistance when giving birth. Mrs. Palme said that children had particularly difficult lives in Namibia. In the First World War, she said, a majority of the victims were soldiers, but in modern war, 90 per cent of the victims were civilians, mostly children. That message, she stressed, must be spread internationally.

79. The Council has received recent reports from the Territory on the campaign of brutal repression waged by the occupation régime, which includes shooting with rubber bullets, beating with sjamboks (whips), detention and torture. The following persons have been detained: the Rev. Jackie Basson, a Roman Catholic priest of Windhoek, in charge of youth activities; Mr. Abner Shilongo, an educator and activist of the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW); Mr. Ignatius Shimweneni, an activist of NANSO; "Chief" Ankama, a NUNW official;

Mr. John Liebengerg, member of the editorial board of the newspaper The Namibian; Mr. Jeremia Nambinga, a youth activist; and Mr. Oswald Shivute, Secretary to the head of the Ovambo tribal authority. 34/

IV. EXPLOITATION OF LABOUR

80. By an elaborate system of land and livestock expropriation, taxation and the promulgation of stringent controls, blacks in Namibia have been rendered destitute in their own country. In their destitution, they have been forced to seek employment in the service of the white minority. In reality, the labour situation as it currently exists in Namibia is one of forced labour, since Africans have never become free wage labourers.

81. Migratory labour, of which contract labour is the most tightly controlled, forms an integral part of the Namibian economic, political and social system. About two thirds of the labour force are migrants on short-term contracts. Employers continue to hire workers without any guarantees of renewals and to house them in large, all-male dormitories known as compounds or hostels. These are usually isolated from local communities and in many cases are controlled by armed guards. 35/ By forcing this sytem on the black population, the illegal South African régime and the transnational corporations in Namibia profit exorbitantly from the minimum worker overhead.

82. Transnational corporations are attracted to Namibia primarily because of the availability of cheap labour. Namibians working for these corporations are employed under a grossly discriminatory system of wages, working conditions and living standards. Although the foreign corporations operating in Namibia and the occupation régime refuse to publish income figures, it is estimated that wages of whites are 18 times greater than those of blacks, and the poorest 40 per cent of the population receives only 6 or 7 per cent of total income. 36/ Most black households in urban areas live on or below the minimum subsistence level; people in the so-called bantustans and rural areas face grinding poverty. Low wages mean that few African workers can afford to bring their families to the urban areas, while the lack of suitable accommodation makes such moves even more difficult.

83. The conditions under which Namibian workers operate are totally hostile and extremely exploitative. There is no protective labour legislation for them. They have no statutory rights to a pension, fixed pay, holiday pay or maternity leave. A worker can be dismissed without prior notice, and such occurrences are frequent. Furthermore, they are not legally entitled to any compensation for dismissal, or to unemployment benefits. 37/ Working conditions are often dangerous and unhealthy, exposing them to racism, abuse and beatings in their work places. On farms, where the white farmers were previously empowered to flog workers, there have been numerous cases in which workers have been brutally assaulted or killed by employers for minor misdemeanours. 38/

84. As a result of deteriorating economic conditions in the Territory, unemployment has risen to alarming levels. While an annual average of 9,000 new workers entered the labour force during the period from 1975 to 1986, only a

quarter of them found employment each year. Consequently, the unemployment rate doubled from 5 per cent in 1975 to 10 per cent a decade later. Moreover, these figures only reflect conditions in the formal sector of the economy; the actual rate of joblessness is probably at least twice as high. Wage levels for blacks are so low that even those who have jobs live far below the poverty line. In 1983, 86 per cent of black wage earners at Windhoek and 99 per cent of those in northern Namibia were estimated to be living below household subsistence level. 39/

85. As previously reported (A/AC.131/285, para. 91), by law white employees have access to recognized negotiating machinery and trade union representation, while blacks do not. Trade unions face harassment and repression, and worker protests have been violently suppressed by the police and army. Labour relations are regulated by the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance of 1952, which sets out detailed negotiating procedures and imposes restrictions on unions. The ordinance originally excluded Africans from its provisions. 40/

86. An amendment to the legislation of 1978 allowed for the registration of unions representing African workers, but further restrictions were imposed on unions seeking registration. The Wages and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1985 makes it illegal for registered trade unions to assist or to be affiliated with any political party. It is widely held that this legislation is intended to curtail the activities of the main union, NUNW, which was founded in 1978 and is affiliated with SWAPO. With few facilities to organize the widely dispersed work-force, independent union organizers in Namibia face great difficulties and constant harassment by the authorities. Nevertheless, as a result of NUNW activities, four major industrial unions have been formed under its umbrella organization. They are the Namibia Food and Allied Union, the Mineworkers' Union of Namibia, the Metal and Allied Namibian Workers' Union and the Namibia Public Workers' Union, whose combined membership is around 41,000. 41/ NUNW is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

87. On 20 and 21 June 1988, NUNW staged a two-day general strike halting production in the country's major mining companies and disrupting commercial life in the country. The strike was in solidarity with a school boycott by students demanding the removal of army bases near schools in northern Namibia, the immediate release of all political detainees, and the withdrawal of "Koevoet" and its allies from the black townships as well as an end to their terrorism against students. 42/

88. On 30 September 1988, an unprovoked police riot broke out at the workers' hostel at Otavi. The incident began with two unidentified men smashing hostel windows and stoning the workers. Immediately thereafter, truckloads of police raced into the hostel premises firing tear-gas and flicking sjamboks. After the residents had repelled tear-gas attacks by the police, army reinforcement was sent in to help. Twenty-two people were arrested and four workers fired. Management refused to reinstate the workers because they had "beaten whites". The negotiation on behalf of the workers was undertaken by the Namibia Public Workers' Union, an affiliate of NUNW.

89. The NUNW-aligned unions, which have organized a large proportion of the Namibian work-force in a period of little more than two years, are committed to

campaigning for Namibian independence under the terms of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). They form a formidable force in the national mobilization by Namibians against the illegal South African occupation of the Territory.

V. THE REFUGEE SITUATION

90. As previously reported (A/AC.131/285, para. 99), a population of approximately 70,000 to 80,000 Namibian refugees exists in Angola, Zambia and other neighbouring countries. In addition, the year 1988 and the first half of 1989 witnessed an unprecedented number of refugees fleeing Namibia. The refugees this time were particularly young and perhaps encouraged by the general atmosphere of rebellion inside Namibia, particularly in schools. SWAPO sources indicated that 10,000 to 20,000 Namibians joined the refugee population during the period under review.

91. The refugees in those countries created emergency needs in the fields of health and education and required food and shelter and clothing. The host countries continue to mobilize and utilize their own resources to meet emergency humanitarian needs and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian agencies, including non-governmental organizations, also provide assistance.

92. UNHCR is expected to provide transportation and other basic needs, including health check-ups, to the refugee population and to assist in their repatriation to Namibia. Other humanitarian agencies are expected to tender other forms of assistance to the refugees to ensure their subsistence and to provide their basic needs. The Council of Churches in Namibia, with the help of the World Council of Churches, is expected to provide accommodation and food once the returnees are in Namibia.

Notes

1/ Alfred T. Moleah, Namibia - The Struggle for Liberation (Wilmington, Disa Press, Inc., 1983).

2/ The New York Times, 17 November 1988.

3/ Mining Annual Review (London) June 1988.

4/ Africa Research Bulletin, Political Series, vol. 25, No. 3, 15 April 1988.

5/ The rand has fluctuated in value in recent years from R 1.0 = $US 1.00 in 1985 to R 2.76 = $US 1.00 in 1989.

6/ The Guardian (Manchester), 18 October 1982.

7/ Country Profile: Namibia, 1988-89 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, London).

Notes (continued)

8/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 21 July 1988.

9/ Ibid., 6 January 1988.

10/ A/C.4/42/SR.10, para. 49, testimony of the Lutheran World Federation.

11/ The Guardian (London), 20 June 1988.

12/ Anti-Apartheid News (London), October 1987.

13/ South Scan (New York), vol. 2, No. 45, 28 July 1988, p. 4.

14/ Namibia Support Committee (London), Action on Namibia Health, 1983, p. 3.

15/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 25 May 1988.

16/ Moleah, op. cit., p. 79.

17/ Namibia in Perspective, edited by Tötemeyer, Kandetu and Werner (Windhoek, 1987).

18/ The Namibian (Windhoek) 30 October 1987; see also The Windhoek Observer, 31 October 1987.

19/ Dr. Neil Andersson, The Health Sector in Namibia (London, School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 1983).

20/ South Africa's Private War of Attrition against Namibian Children - A Testimony by Anne Skilongo presented at the Conference on Children, Apartheid and Repression in Namibia held in London on 27 October 1988.

21/ The Namibian (Windhoek), 4 November 1988.

22/ Ibid., 25 October 1988.

23/ Eye Witness Account by Erastus Haitengela, p. 2.

24/ Ibid., pp. 3 and 4.

25/ The Namibian (Windhoek), 30 September 1988.

26/ A paper presented by Jacobina Ndalikokule to the Conference on Children, Apartheid and Repression in Namibia.

27/ The Namibian (Windhoek), 16 September 1988.

28/ Ibid., 21 October 1988.

Notes (continued)

29/ Namibia Press Agency, 29 September 1988.

30/ Ibid., 1 October 1988.

31/ Namibia Communications Centre press release, 24 October 1988.

32/ SWAPO press release, 31 October 1988.

33/ Anti-Apartheid News (London), January-February 1988.

34/ SWAPO press release, 7 June 1988.

35/ D. Simon and R. Moorsom, Working under South African Occupation: Labour in Namibia: Fact Paper on Southern Africa (London, International Defence and Aid Fund, 1987), No. 14, p. 15.

36/ United Nations Institute for Namibia, Namibia: Perspectives for National Reconstruction and Development (Lusaka, 1986), pp. 77, 856 and 857; see also S. Smith, Namibia: A Violation of Trust (Oxfam, 1986), p.20.

37/ Simon and Moorsom, op. cit., pp. 24 and 25.

38/ Ibid., pp. 24-28.

39/ Country Profile: Namibia, 1987-88 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, London), pp. 17 and 18.

40/ Focus on Political Repression in Southern Africa (London, International Defence and Aid Fund), No. 63, March-April 1986, p. 10.

41/ The Windhoek Advertiser, 17 December 1987.

42/ Ibid., 14 June 1988.